


JPRS Report



East Europe

19980202 074

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 3

REPRODUCED BY
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
NATIONAL TECHNICAL
INFORMATION SERVICE
SPRINGFIELD, VA 22161

East Europe

JPRS-EER-91-160

CONTENTS

25 October 1991

BULGARIA

First Deputy Defense Minister on Training Plans [BULARSKA ARMIYA 3 Sep]	1
Rakovski Legion Cites Abuses by Defense Ministry [BULGARIYA 14 Aug]	2

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Republic Breakup Viewed as Realistic Possibility [RESPEKT 6 Oct]	3
Controversy Surrounds Carnogursky-Miklosko Letter	5
Miklosko Explains Reasons [RESPEKT 6 Oct]	5
Argument's Validity Denied [RESPEKT 6 Oct]	6
Czech Contributions Listed [RESPEKT 6 Oct]	7
Wartime Slovak State Decried [RESPEKT 6 Oct]	7

POLAND

Focus on Presidential Chancellery, Staff [GAZETA WYBORCZA 28 Sep]	9
Poles Rediscover Own Experience as Expellees [SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG 20 Sep]	22
Commentary on Nature of Defense Structure [POLSKA ZBROJNA 23 Sep]	23
Alternate Privatization Plan Said To Be Ignored [GAZETA WYBORCZA 4 Oct]	25
Sugar Beet Production for Year Detailed [RZECZPOSPOLITA 18 Sep]	28
POLITYKA Weekly News Roundup: 29 Sep-5 Oct [5 Oct]	29

YUGOSLAVIA

General Kadijevic Discusses Army Goals [BORBA 5-6 Oct]	31
Data on Mixture of Ethnic Groups in Republics [BORBA 30 Sep]	32
Views of Serbian Democratic Party Leaders Scored [VJESNIK 5 Oct]	33
Popularity of Serbian Paramilitary Leaders [NIN 20 Sep]	34
Errors of Croatian Democratic Community Viewed [NIN 27 Sep]	35
Paramilitary Units of Croatian Rights Party [NIN 20 Sep]	37
Bosnian Crisis Command Coordinator Interviewed [DANAS 1 Oct]	38
Maribor Corps Difficulties With JNA Withdrawal [POLITIKA 4 Oct]	40

First Deputy Defense Minister on Training Plans
91BA1131A Sofia BULGARSKA ARMIYA in Bulgarian
3 Sep 91 p 1

[Interview with Colonel General Lyuben Petrov, first deputy defense minister and chief of the Army General Staff, by Krasen Buchkov; place and date not given: "The Hour for Planning Has Struck"]

[Text] There is no place for planning delay or planning bureaucracy—so thinks Colonel General Lyuben Petrov, first deputy defense minister and chief of the Army General Staff.

The subunits are performing two major missions in September: readying weapons and equipment for operation under autumn and winter conditions, and planning for the new training year. And since, without a plan, these are impossible, we sought the opinions of the chief of the General Staff on this question of such importance.

[Buchkov] Colonel General, sir, is there anything new on the planning for the new 1992 training year?

[Petrov] The regulatory documents have been drawn up in conformity with our defense doctrine after thoroughgoing analysis of troop training. They take into account the Persian Gulf war experience and take heed of the new realities in our country and in international relations.

Quite a while before the adoption of the planning documents a number of suggestions were made by the staffs and the troops. They were widely discussed and analyzed at the Defense Ministry. To a great extent, maximalism has been avoided in the planning documents. The realism in them is much greater than ever before.

What is new is that the Defense Ministry Collegium discussed and adopted a new structure of the training year, widely discussed in the branches of the armed forces. Characteristic of it is its flexibility. Commanders are given freedom; initiative is given full scope. They will have the right to determine the length of training stages and the topics for discussion in classwork. They are given an opportunity in working out lesson plans to schedule as many training days as can realistically be accomplished. It is not possible nor is it efficient for a subunit with a smaller makeup to have as many training hours as a more massive subunit. On this score, the commanders will have the last word.

[Buchkov] You have passed through various military echelons. You have been a large-unit (division, brigade, corps) and an army commander. Have you and your subordinate staffs been bothered by the habitual tardiness of the basic regulatory planning documents before the start of every new training year?

[Petrov] Right! Year after year the printing-up of the regulatory documents was delayed. Year after year the

commanders and staffs, especially at the tactical echelons, were impeded in making a complete, concrete, and precisely targeted plan. In practice, the planning and placements were done at one and the same time. This foreordained paradoxes, too. Some officers planned the training year while others implemented it. Often replanning was necessitated—once or twice. Instances were not rare when additional directives were issued. Instead of organization, all this introduced disorganization into the work of commanders and staffs. That is why this year the Defense Ministry leadership took a longer-term approach and the placements of officers were made a month earlier. The MZ [ministarska zapoved; ministerial order] and the organization-and-methods directives of the branches of the armed forces were drawn up earlier.

[Buchkov] Yet for all that, when will those basic documents get to the subunits?

[Petrov] These documents were approved at a meeting of the Defense Ministry collegium a few days ago. I think they'll be dispatched to the subunits in just a few days—not later than 5 September. (The general raised the telephone and was connected with Colonel Trendafil Vasilev, chief of the Ministry Publishing House. The deadline for dispatch of the documents was made specific.) About seven or eight of the documents will be in the hands of commanders and in the small elements. The officials who will implement the plan will do the planning.

[Buchkov] Have the measures been concretized in the ministerial order?

[Petrov] What previously was enslaved from above is now liberated. Recognition of the necessity of leaving the initiative in the hands of the commanders runs like a red thread through the measures. To a greater degree than any other time the ministerial order concretizes the measures branch by branch of the armed forces, and these by their reciprocal backup, without going into the details of, or undertaking to set deadlines for, the organization of individual training exercises, firing practice, driving, etc.

[Buchkov] Are you optimistic about timely and complete planning by commanders and staffs for the 1992 training year?

[Petrov] I believe that steps forward have been made. The planning will be done on schedule, will be more concrete, and will be of higher quality. To be sure, in the future we will seek ways of making all planning documents more precise and of improving them. There's no longer any place for planning delays or planning bureaucracy. The structure of the training year will be improved, too.

Rakovski Legion Cites Abuses by Defense Ministry

91BA1122A Sofia BULGARIYA in Bulgarian 14 Aug 91
p 4

[Open letter of Executive Board of Bulgarian Officers' Rakovski Legion: "Personnel Moved Unprincipledly, Like Chessmen"]

[Text] We welcome the breath of fresh air passing over the Bulgarian Army. The changes in Defense Ministry leadership are a precondition for better days for the Bulgarian officer and the Army as a whole.

We cannot help, however, sharing our uneasiness over certain personnel moves with which the old military *nomenklatura* is trying to square accounts with some of the Rakovski Legion activists, establish their own people in crucial posts, and strike a blow at the quality of the Army's officer corps.

Officer personnel are now rated in accordance with a Temporary Procedure, which strikingly resembles the avant-garde role of communists in the former Army party organization. In June 1991 the Legion's Executive Board sent the Defense Ministry a reasoned position in which it showed the unscientific character and unobjective basis of the procedure. But the Defense Ministry for the nth time ignored our opinion and adopted the procedure worked out by the Personnel Administration.

In violation of the basic principles governing the relations between the Defense Ministry and the Rakovski Legion, it is anticipated that Legion President Captain Doychin Boyadzhiev will be reduced in rank though there are no penalties or official demerits against him. Lieutenant Colonel Pet'o Boyadzhiev, Legion vice president, has been declared redundant and transferred to table an organization that is about to be abolished.

Lieutenant General Ten'o Zapryanov, chief of the Defense Ministry's Personnel Administration, and other command and administrative-methods "activists" are menacing the club presidents in Sofia, Pazardzhik, Stara Zagora, and Varna; they sow rumors and pit officers themselves against others.

The head of the Khr. Botev ShZO [Reserve Officers School], Colonel Krustev, asserted to respected officers whose retirement on pension was under consideration that he would help them, but "The Legion is opposed." After the officers among themselves found out where the intrigue was coming from, the club made public its

written position regarding the retirement on pension of these experienced Army specialists.

In Subunit 24630, where an audit had already been made by the Presidency and the Defense Ministry, Captain Zhivko Iliev and Captain Georgi Stoychev were subjected to mental harassment by the commander, Lieutenant Colonel Kiro Petkov, and his superiors. As a result, Capt. Iliev fell ill of psoriasis, and Capt. Stoychev entered a hospital with a nervous disorder, after which he underwent three operations. According to Colonel Karakachanov, division deputy commander, these officers were not subjected to repression for, according to them, "physical violence was not used."

The former military faculty of the G. Dimitrov VIF [Higher Institute of Physical Education] gave haven to the lieutenant colonels in regional military administrations, while the younger officers were recommended for discharge. At the same time, a considerable number of aides-de-camp of the former minister and his deputies, as well as personal friends of the previous and of the present minister, received high posts and ranks. Embedded in the personal plans as especially valuable key cadres, these gentlemen continue to move upwards from Ninth-of-September inertia.

Using the power given them by the laws and regulations, intellectually and morally bankrupt people are trying to deprive the Bulgarian Army of good professionals and honest patriots. We believe that the further stay of such individuals in key positions is tantamount to battles lost by our army.

We suggest that an independent commission of the Presidency and the government visit the garrisons where tension is on the increase among service personnel, solve the conflict situations, and observe the Army until the end of the shifts. We believe that the retention of Lieutenant General Zapryanov in the position of chief of the Personnel Administration serves to generate tension and is a real threat to the Bulgarian Army's combat capability.

We call upon the clubs to protect their members and to oppose the unprincipled moves of personnel like chessmen as well as attempts at retribution against Legion activists, all valuable professionals and all creatively thinking commissioned personnel. We urge the clubs to alert the Defense Ministry, the Presidency, and the Executive Board to such cases and to seek the assistance of public opinion and of the mass information media.

Republic Breakup Viewed as Realistic Possibility
92CH0053A Prague RESPEKT in Czech 6 Oct 91 p 2

[Article by Petr Janyska: "Let Us Not Try To Convince Ourselves About Something That Is Not True; The Breakup of the Federation as a Possible Solution"]

[Text] Most of Slovakia's citizens are supporters of the federation; only a minority of loudmouth hecklers and a couple of politicians who are taking advantage of the surge of nationalism in order to get to the top crave independence. These views are very widespread in Bohemia. Where, then, is that invisible "silent majority" hiding? Hardly anything is heard about it. Allegedly, it is frightened by its aggressive opponents; it is a group of decent people who, as often is the case, are averse to calling attention to themselves in any way. That allegation is used to explain why ten days ago in Bratislava nationalist slogans managed to mobilize 30,000 demonstrators while the idea of our common state could bring together barely a couple of thousand.

We would expect that the "silent majority" would reveal itself in some indirect way: in anonymous public opinion polls by supporting the profederation political forces, or by showing preference to publications that support the federation.

Not so. Scarcely 5 percent of the voters in Slovakia would cast the ballot for the VPN [Public Against Violence] and a mere 7 percent for the Democratic Party. In comparison with the nationalist publications which appear in hundreds of thousands of copies, VEREJNOST, an all-state daily published by the victorious governmental party, prints 11,000 copies; the weekly ECHO did not sell more than 5,000 copies, and recently it ceased publication. Thus, it seems that in Slovakia the profederalist idea is simply not attractive and that the people there are more or less consciously pining for independence.

The Constant of Slovakia's History

It would be too simplistic to maintain that the most assiduous forces who demand sovereignty for Slovakia are former members of State Security, agents and persons with a checkered past. Although that is true in many individual cases (and before long RESPEKT will present documented revelations about that), it still cannot explain the very phenomenon of the call for independence.

Whenever in our modern history a moment came for the amorphous, suppressed yearnings of our society to reach the boiling point and to begin to take a form—in 1918, 1968, 1990 (as well as in 1938)—calls for some type of sovereignty could be heard in Slovakia. To be sure, that signals an important development. If the year 1968 introduced in Bohemia political postulates, far more calls for national self-determination were heard in Slovakia. Admittedly, that also means something.

Evidently, Slovakia is an entity historically so definitely formed that in every historical moment, whenever it seems feasible, it will demand some kind of independence and will not stop until it becomes fully independent. That is quite normal: In Bohemia such a process culminated in 1918, with Prague as the capital and Masaryk as the president.

So What Do They Want?

It is often said that the Slovaks "actually do not know what in fact they really want," and that they do not wish to be completely independent. Allegedly, one moment they are all in a dither about a hyphen, next about laws on power-sharing, then again about their own railroad, and now about their very own foreign policy. Who can figure them out? Yet it is not difficult to understand them: All those steps represent intermediate stages in their efforts to gain absolute independence, whether individual Slovak politicians admit it or not.

In the greatest probability, the obfuscation of the demands from Bratislava may be partly strategic and partly genuine. To be sure, not many Czech politicians even in 1918 were able to envision an independent republic, and in one way or another they were linking their plans to Vienna up to the last moment. How large a part of the population in the Czech lands at that time believed in an independent state? In the matters of self-determination, however, modern nations cannot be satisfied once and for all with partial solutions. After a while the same problem will reappear, mostly in a far more aggressive and dangerous form (Catalonia, the Basque Provinces, Corsica, not to mention Ireland). As for Slovakia, why wait for some conflict to come to a head?

Provincialism

Still another argument speaks for the separation. It suffices to watch the television news programs with the obligatory Slovak inputs which insert into prime time news reports purely regional topics (masses celebrated in churches in district towns; unveiling of memorial tablets dedicated to local poets), and one becomes acutely aware how introspective Slovakia is today and how it acts like a province, as though nothing were more important than an anniversary of a revivalist or a folk festival somewhere in Dolny Kubin.

Meanwhile, a struggle for the transformation of our economy and of our whole society is now underway in Bohemia. The changes are proceeding at a slow pace; very few people can think in the new way, and at the same time, very many obstacles that act as brakes, due to inertia, or even intentional, are placed in the path of the changes. We should take a good look at Germany, France, or Italy, and inhale the atmosphere of their well-running economies and open democracy. Instead, we are being pulled back by Bratislava: by the provincial fear of the big world, by the alleged Slovak "specifics," by the quashing of a number of policies adopted by the

federal team, and their deformation into some kind of state-controlled perestroika. There also are similar forces in Bohemia, and the Slovak process encourages them. If we intend to become one of the West European countries, that does not mean that we have to enter a kind of inert Europe whose door is easy to open. Europe is a caravan that is speeding forth and that at best may slow down a little or toss us a rope, but if we want to get abreast with it, we must advance full speed ahead, and not keep glancing backward forever.

Slovakia today has its own government and its own parliament, of course, with restricted jurisdiction. Slovak politicians are in a position where they do not bear full responsibility for their acts; they always can blame some problems on the federal government and at the same time feel assured that ultimately the federal government will come to their rescue—with subsidies and redistributions. They insult Prague the way teenagers insult their parents because they know that if need be, their folks will always help them pay their rent. If they were the leaders of an independent state and were fully accountable to its citizens (as well in the international arena), under the pressure of that situation, they would be forced to act responsibly.

An Open-Ended Referendum

The democrats are convinced that the referendum will straighten out the situation. It is in fact the most democratic of all possible solutions. Let the citizens express their will. Of course, sociologists have already predicted the results of the referendum: According to them, the majority will vote for the preservation of the federation. And there is the rub: It is quite probable that if asked directly, a major part of Slovakia's citizens (although they agree with the demands for an autonomous development) will fail to gather the courage to answer straightforwardly and conclusively that they want a complete breakup.

However, what will happen after the referendum? It is certain that the nationalists would increase their pressure and definitely would not lay down their arms. Some anxiety could become evident only if some more prominent pro-federation forces will benefit from the results of the plebiscite, but there is no such force in Bratislava today.

According to the polls, one-half of the same citizens who will vote in the referendum would quite recently have voted for the SNS [Slovak National Party] and the HZDS [Movement for a Democratic Slovakia], in other words, for parties that are directly promoting independence. If we add to them the still undecided voters, and if we take into consideration the ambiguous orientation of the KDH [Christian Democratic Movement], the results of Slovak elections next year seem rather predictable. So what about this schizophrenic outlook? If for no other reasons but history and democracy, it is obvious

that the referendum must take place, although it may not provide the definitive decision about the Czecho-Slovak problem.

Democracy and Minorities in Jeopardy?

Understandably, many legitimate arguments speak against the breakup of Czechoslovakia. One of them says that if anything of that sort happens, democracy in Slovakia cannot survive and the postcommunist forces together with the fascist heirs of the Slovak State will rise to the top. Furthermore, it is alleged that the minorities, in particular the Hungarians, Gypsies, and Jews will be in jeopardy. However, should such a threat be imminent, how in the world could it be averted even by our existing federation? After all, just recently a Slovak daily unabashedly published a statement by the mayor of Zilina (elected on the SNS slate) that in a couple of months those individuals who fail to support Slovakia's independence will be tried as traitors of the nation—but nothing happened, the prosecutor's office failed to protest, and the mayor stays in office. Is not the idea that the federation is the guarantor of the Slovak progress just a silly self-delusion?

A strange short circuit occurred in the Slovak Republic: A considerable part of its citizens would like to have some kind of independence for their republic, but that does not mean that they are yearning for a dictatorship or neocommunist. Nevertheless, a major part of the dogmatic forces from the past are now postulating independence. If Slovakia becomes independent, they will lose their halo of fighters for a sovereign state, and the population will very soon judge them as any other political party—according to their management of daily affairs—in competition with the democrats. Moreover, in today's Europe it does not seem very probable that a small state, which to a considerable degree will depend on all-European structures and loans, might somehow succumb to semifascism, although even that possibility cannot be excluded.

Under the Aegis of an International Conference

The international status is another serious argument. If the federation breaks apart, the new state will find itself without guaranteed borders, and it may be expected that at least Hungary and the Ukraine will make claims for its territory. Thus, a potential hotbed of dangerous conflicts may emerge. A feasible solution would be the division of the federation under the aegis of an international conference (possibly with the participation of the European Community) where the neighboring states would pledge in advance that they will respect the current borders.

Moreover, according to a frequent argument, "Europe would not accept" the breakup of the CSFR. West Europe is understandably anxious about the disintegration of the East if it will cause outbreaks of armed conflicts. On the other hand, aspirations for national independence cannot be put off by references to some

European vetoes. Many other demands of all sorts will probably emerge in this part of our continent.

If Czecho-Slovakia's separation could be achieved really peacefully, by agreement, and with the participation of its neighboring states, that would mean relief for all of Europe and serve as proof that artificial protraction of the status quo is not the only way to achieve peace. If something of that sort can be accomplished, then certainly nothing would hinder the admission of both new states in the European Community. They would set an example for the whole eastern part of our continent on how to avoid the Yugoslav variant, of which everyone is afraid, while no one fears another little star on Europe's flag and one more democratic government.

Prague's Straightforward Policy

Naturally, in our case Prague must articulate a clear, positive policy and not pussyfoot around this or that statement or letter by a Slovak politician. After a year of ad hoc reactions it is high time for Prague to formulate its own doctrine and to adhere to its own program, to spell out what kind of society and economy it aims at, and to say that if Slovakia also will opt for the same path, we may go ahead together after the autonomy of each of our republics is clearly defined. But should Slovakia choose another way, we cannot have one state with two economies and two political orientations. In that case it will be preferable to live side by side as two independent states, neither of which will be able to complain any longer that it has to subsidize the other.

At first, of course, the separation would be painful and complicated, but it also could mark a bright starting point for our further progress.

Controversy Surrounds Carnogursky-Miklosko Letter

Miklosko Explains Reasons

92CH0055A Prague RESPEKT in Czech 6 Oct 91 p 6

[Interview with Frantisek Miklosko, Slovak National Council chairman, by Jan Machacek; place and date not given: "Military Occupation of Slovakia; F. Miklosko on the Roots of Slovakia's Distrust of Prague"]

[Text] [Machacek] The letter addressed by you and Jan Carnogursky to Minister Dienstbier protesting the text of the preamble to the Czechoslovak-German pact and denying the legal continuity of the Czechoslovak state elicited considerable indignation in the Czech Republic.

[Miklosko] In our letter we clearly retained an objective position. We adopted an unambiguous attitude toward the regime of the Slovak State: We distanced ourselves from it. There were the deportations of Jews; there was the rule of a single party; Slovakia was at war with the Allies. Of course, the preamble to the pact states that the legal continuity of the Czechoslovak state had not been broken, but we are convinced that it is not true. I and Dr.

Carnogursky are the highest constitutional representatives of the Slovak Republic, and it was simply a matter of our professional honor. Another problem is that we had not been consulted at all about that agreement; for example, I heard about that particular phrase from the program "What the Week Has Brought." The Munich Pact of 1938 had no connection whatsoever with the declaration of the Slovak Republic. In October 1938 the Vienna Arbitration took place and there Slovakia lost a whole one-third of its territory. Czechoslovakia continued to exist, Benes had resigned, Hacha became president, and in March 1939 the Slovak Republic was declared on the floor of the Slovak parliament. It was not until 1941 that the superpowers did not recognize the Czechoslovak government-in-exile. Thus, for at least two years there clearly was a legal break. It would be difficult for us to speak of any full-fledged legal continuity, because there existed another constitution and the laws of the Slovak State were in force. That is an objective fact. We also should like to deal with the unfortunate legacy of the Slovak State. However, we can hardly come to grips with it by pronouncing a phrase that is not true.

[Machacek] Can you from your personal point of view see anything positive in the existence of the Slovak State?

[Miklosko] I was not alive at that time and therefore, I can speak only about things I heard from my parents. One must realize that none of the Slovak politicians at that time wanted independence, all they wanted was autonomy. The twenty-year struggle for autonomy is a fact that cannot be erased from the history of the republic. Autonomy was declared in October 1938 and it was only afterwards that the Vienna Arbitration was held. It was expected that Bratislava, too, would fall into Hungarian hands, which would have turned Slovakia into a pathetic cripple. That did not come to pass. Slovakia's autonomy retained the capital as its symbol. On 8 March 1939 the Czechoslovak—or rather, I should call it, alas—the Czech army occupied Slovakia and all deputies of the Slovak parliament were imprisoned. That illegal act was supposed to abolish the autonomy which had been approved by Benes in October of 1938. Of course soon, that is in less than a week, it was clear that Hitler was standing at the borders. The troops were pulled back, the deputies released, and then it so happened that Slovakia was able to decide whether to be divided between Poland, Hungary, the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, and the Reich, or whether it could become an independent state. The military occupation was the last crucial shock Prague dealt to Slovakia. It was one of the reasons why Slovakia distrusts a Prague which makes promises and immediately revokes them. When the law on powersharing was debated in Prague, President Havel came to the parliament and demanded that the laws on the referendum and on emergency powers of the president precede that particular law. That thoroughly shocked Slovakia, as it was directly linked with the issue of autonomy in 1938 and consequently with the military occupation of Slovakia.

One must not look at the Slovak State only from one side. Of course, at the moment of the proclamation of the Slovak State there was a group of people who simply disagreed with such a step. Naturally, there also were individuals who enthusiastically supported that idea, and who donated their gold jewelry to the state treasury. Nothing is absolutely clear-cut. How would you rate the current republic? Here is Havel who is a personality famous all over the world, and here are forces that represent anarchy and are harbingers of a catastrophe. Every society, every state has a positive and a negative side.

[Machacek] What do you say about the role played by the church in the Slovak regime during the war?

[Miklosko] In my view, the role of the church in the Slovak State has been slanted and distorted over the past 40 years. Certainly, the church had held a strong position: The president was a priest. However, most people in Slovakia were Catholics, and no other natural structure existed at that time. The new state simply had to rely on the church, because in those days the church represented the only moral force. What took place later reflected already the activity of national guards and of the pro-Nazi forces. Just as State Security in the 1950's dominated the whole country in such a way that even Gottwald could not feel secure, the same thing was true in Slovakia under Hitler's coercion. The expression "the cleric-fascist state" is an artificial term that was supposed to aid gradual liquidation of the church over the past 40 years. In addition to President Tiso, only two priests served in the Slovak parliament. One of them was posthumously honored with an award from the representatives of the Jewish memorial Yad Vashem for rescuing Jews.

[Machacek] In addition to your office as the chairman of the SNR [Slovak National Council] you are also a member of the executive committee of the VPN [Public Against Violence]. The VPN council agrees with the preamble of the pact and does not share your opinion. Does it mean that in the given political situation you, as the chairman of the SNR, wanted your statement to act as a balance between the separatist and profederal forces, in other words, to appear nonpartisan?

[Miklosko] All I felt was my inner urge to address that inaccurate point. One must adhere to the truth. A politician who remains silent about such untruths would look foolish. Although the VPN executive committee has overruled me, there still is a kind of quiet, correct toleration among us. In the VPN there is no partisan discipline in the communist sense of that word. Thus, I do not have to change a view that is my heart-felt conviction. I do not feel that I have hurt the reputation of the VPN; it is possible that I have turned into a controversial figure, but our whole current era is in fact controversial. Sometimes you cannot even show your face in the street. Do what you may, you will always get

on somebody's nerves. It depends on a person's inner conviction what to consider and let pass by and what to address.

Argument's Validity Denied

92CH0055B Prague RESPEKT in Czech 6 Oct 91 p 6

[Article by Jan Mlynarik, Slovak historian and Public Against Violence deputy: "For Accuracy's Sake; The Proclamation of the Slovak State Was Unconstitutional"]

[Text] It is nonsense to maintain that the Munich Pact of 1938 had no connection with the declaration of the Slovak State. The Munich Pact provided the crucial point from which all legal acts proceeded, among them the Vienna Arbitration in which Slovakia lost one-third of its territory. The arbitration took place on 2 November 1938, and not in October of 1938 as Mr. Miklosko alleges. The name of Czechoslovakia was then already hyphenated. That was in accordance with the law on autonomy. However, at that time the constitution in force since 1920 did not permit separation of the state's territory. Therefore, although it was autonomous, the Slovak parliament lacked the authority to proclaim the Slovak State; that was an unconstitutional act.

The Slovak State was established in a time of trouble, under duress. It was recognized mainly by Germany's allies and occupied states; also, it was recognized by the Soviet Union which signed a nonaggression pact with Germany in 1939. However, following the German attack on the USSR, the Slovak State severed its diplomatic contacts with the USSR. A few days later even the USSR recognized the Czechoslovak government-in-exile in London.

According to Mr. Miklosko, the legal continuity of the Czechoslovak state had been suspended for a period of at least two years. Nevertheless, in 1941 the superpowers recognized the government-in-exile, as well as Czechoslovakia's pre-Munich borders on the basis of Czechoslovakia's legal continuity. Benes would constantly argue that in legal terms, our state never ceased to exist. Of course, the republic fell apart: One part was occupied, while the other declared itself an independent state. However, two different entities, the actual breakup of the state and the legal continuity connected with the recognition of the government-in-exile, must not be confused. Had its legal continuity not been recognized, the subsequent state would have to renew all international pacts of the Versailles Treaty, the Trianon Treaty, and other pacts that refer to Slovakia's borders. In view of the fact that the superpowers recognized Czechoslovakia's legal continuity, and thus, also its existence within its pre-Munich borders, among other things, there was no need to revise the borders and the representative offices. Even the Yalta conference recognized legal continuity of the Czechoslovak Republic.

Therefore, since Mr. Miklosko claims that he is concerned about the objective legal and historical continuity

of this whole issue, at the least one should ask from which legal and historical concepts he actually proceeds.

Czech Contributions Listed

92CH0055C Prague RESPEKT in Slovak 6 Oct 91 p 6

[Article by Rudolf J. Vaculik: "Give Him a Shave! Letter to the Chairman of the Slovak National Council, Mr. Frantisek Miklosko"]

[Text] Dear Mr. Chairman of the Slovak National Council,

I used to hold you in great respect and admiration for your attitude, but I could not believe my own ears when on 13 August of this year I heard the Slovak radio broadcast your views about the "occupation of Slovakia by the Czech army."

Your prestige in my eyes is diminished, but because I have the impression that you have learned history from Mr. Hrnka or from the Carnogursky family, I should like to fill in the gaps in your one-sided education.

You certainly know and will agree with me that prior to 28 October 1918 Slovakia did not exist as a state in the eyes of the world. It was known only as Upper Hungary or Felvidek. However, as early as on 12 September 1918 the Slovak National Council was organized, on 18 October 1918 the Washington Declaration was published, and on 28 October 1918 the Czechoslovak Republic was proclaimed—with the participation of Slovak representatives and patriots.

Nevertheless, the Hungarian army continued to wreak havoc in Slovakia and the Slovaks were defenseless against it; for that reason, from 2 November to 30 December 1918 Czech volunteers were coming to Slovakia to protect Slovakia against the Hungarians. In fierce combats they expelled the Hungarian army, but when on 21 March 1919 the communist Republic of Councils was organized in Hungary, that army, aided by Slovak and Hungarian communists, returned and began to loot and destroy property. The infamous slogan: "Give him a shave!" which was then first heard meant in fact "Hang him!" On 16 April 1919 the Alliance launched an offensive against the Hungarian Republic of Councils and on 27 April 1919 the Czech and Slovak soldiers put an end to the Slovak Republic of Councils. The graves of many Czech volunteers killed during that action are spread all across Slovakia.

A memorial tablet at the railroad station in Trnava used to honor the twelve Czech policemen killed in the fight against the Hungarian Bolsheviks who had arrived in an armored train from Sered. I was quite astounded when a new, black tablet replaced that original one made of white and brown marble. The text on the original one was: "In eternal memory of the Czech policemen who gave their lives in combat with Hungarian soldiers while defending this railroad station on 13 November 1918..." The text of the new tablet was changed as follows: "... In

memory of the Slovak patriots who on 13 November 1918..." This again shows how history can be revised!

The borders of Czechoslovakia—and thus, also of Slovakia—were determined on 4 June 1920 by the Trianon Treaty on Czechoslovak-Hungarian borders and by the Versailles arrangement. In Versailles on 28 June 1919, 27 states concluded a treaty on borders with Germany and gradually with other states.

On 23 September 1938 the Czechoslovak Government declared mobilization, but on 30 September 1938 it was forced to accept the Munich ultimatum, and on 1 October 1938 to cede the Sudetenland. The Poles occupied the Tesin region. At the same time, the Hungarian Government began making claims on Slovakia. At that time the deployment of the Czechoslovak army to the Hungarian borders prevented the Hungarian army from occupying Slovakia. At the so-called Vienna Arbitration on 2 November 1938 Hitler permitted the Hungarians to annex the south of Slovakia and forced the Czechoslovak army to retreat.

When the Slovak parliament, coerced by Hitler, voted on 14 March 1939 to establish the Slovak Republic, it simultaneously provided Hitler with the argument that international treaties and pacts that safeguarded Czechoslovak borders were invalid; they concerned a subject that had ceased to exist. On 15 March 1939 Hitler was able to occupy Bohemia and Moravia and declare them his protectorate.

Anyone who regards the truly fraternal help of the Czech and Moravian volunteers in 1918 and 1919, or the protection of Slovakia's southern border by the Czechoslovak army in 1938, as an occupation of Slovakia by the Czech troops, can only be a survivor mourning communist or Hungarian totalitarianism!

Dear Mr. Chairman of the SNR, it is not enough to study mathematics or religion; one must also learn our history—even though I admit that during the era of communist totalitarianism real facts were hard to find.

[Signed] Rudolf J. Vaculik, Vrbove

Wartime Slovak State Decried

92CH0055D Prague RESPEKT in Czech 6 Oct 91 p 16

[Letter to RESPEKT by Miroslav Lehky: "Open Letter to Frantisek Miklosko, Chairman of the SNR, and Jan Carnogursky, Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic"]

[Text] Gentlemen:

I was shocked by your rejection of the preamble to the German-Czecho-Slovak treaty which confirms the continuity of the existence of the Czechoslovak state from 1918 to date. I doubt that you realize the full import of your statement, both from the legal and historical points of view, and its consequences for the further development and process of European unification. To say the

least, your statement and opinion approves, albeit perhaps unintentionally, the occupation and destruction of the Czechoslovak Republic and all the crimes committed 1938-45 by the Nazis, not only on Czechoslovakia's territory, but in all Nazi-occupied states. Consequently, the continuity of every state that had been occupied by Nazi Germany may then be in doubt.

I understand your objectives: To defend the legality of the Slovak State and to link its existence with the new Slovak state which now is the object of your efforts. But what logically acceptable explanation can be given at this point to the citizens of Slovakia? After all, it is alleged that we had lived a good life in the Slovak State, despite the fact that during the era of the Slovak State the total number of victims of Naziism in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia amounted to about 500,000.

The Nazi occupation cost our Polish brethren 5 million victims, not to mention the additional scores of millions all over Europe. The one thing I cannot clearly see is for how long your Slovak fathers were building that Slovak State. If for more than six years, then they necessarily had to believe in the victory of Hitler, that mass murderer and psychopath. Since it is alleged that the Slovak State was Christian-democratic and since you both, Mr. Miklosko and Mr. Carnogursky, as well as I and my family, are practicing Catholics, we must remember the following: At the time that the Slovak State was "flourishing," the current pope, John Paul II, was working as a slave laborer in a quarry. At that time Hitler murdered one-third of Poland's priests, including Maximilian Kolbe; in Bohemia and Moravia scores of outstanding priests, whom I knew personally, perished in concentration camps. Just before the end of World War II, on 5 April 1945, the Nazis executed one of the most prominent Christian theologians, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, who had publicly condemned the ideology of Naziism. I shall not mention my own fate during that period. All I ask is, why did my friends sacrifice their lives in the Battle of

Britain and on all the battlefields of World War II, if we do not recognize the continuity of the Czechoslovak state?

I emphasize that I respect the right of self-determination of every nation, and thus, also of the Slovaks. However, I doubt that a state imposed by politicians whom the nation has not empowered to create an independent Slovak state, would be a state with legal and social justice. In addition, the non-Slovak citizens of the new Slovak state would become second-class citizens. You, Mr. Miklosko, and you, Mr. Carnogursky, have no idea of the political sinkhole the extremist nationalists and the former old structures are preparing for you after the declaration of an independent Slovakia. I had an opportunity to hear their views first-hand. A state based on a nationalist principle cannot be just; that view is neither new nor of my invention.

As one who remembers the first Czechoslovak Republic and who was born in Slovakia and lived there for 72 years, I take the liberty of saying that despite all the problems coexistence between Czechs and Slovaks involve, we would not be able to achieve such cultural and social progress in any other state system.

In conclusion I should like to remind you, dear Dr. Carnogursky, how the Czech dissidents supported you and the handful of Slovak dissidents. How splendid was our common goal in September of 1989 when we defended you with the Bratislava Five, regardless of nationality, against the perverse totalitarian system.

I firmly believe that even though I shall not live to see it, a century of mutual understanding, respect, tolerance and love is coming, because the history of mankind as well as of the whole universe share a positive attitude expressed by the love of human beings for one another. Therefore, I beseech both of you, seek in our nations that which unites us, and many things do, and not that which separates us.

[Signed] Miroslav Lehky, Bratislava

Focus on Presidential Chancellery, Staff

92EP0039A Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish
28 Sep 91 pp 10-14

[Article by Ernest Skalski: "All the President's Men"]

[Text]

Skalski's Commentary

If we compare Walesa with Pilsudski (this is, as they put it now, a legit comparison) we should note, among others, the following difference: There are no people who are ready to die for Lech Walesa. If only! Pilsudski never had a world stature comparable to that of Walesa. He never enjoyed support in his own country as broad as that of Lech Walesa in 1989, nor did he have behind him a movement as massive as the Solidarity leader did in 1980 and 1981. Instead, the commandant had extensively built-up cadres who were prepared to carry out his political intentions, including obtaining and maintaining power for him, rather than fans. He also had in his immediate entourage a circle of people who were blindly devoted to him and were prepared to carry out anything he ordered faithfully and without questions, and who believed that that was best for Poland.

At present, such an arrangement does not appear possible. However, the exact opposite of it, which presently surrounds the president of the Republic of Poland, does not appear to be desirable. This is not merely a matter of comfortably exercising power because in discussing the Chancellery we are de facto discussing the Presidency. In turn, this is a concern of entire Poland.

As far as the Chancellery itself is concerned, a quote from Minister Siwek with which Agnieszka Kublik begins her article says most aptly what the Chancellery should be and what it unfortunately is not due to, among others, the minister in question. According to this formula, the Chancellery should be unnoticeable in political life. Its efficiency should be reflected in the in the quality of work of the president and in the efficiency of his operations.

The president of the Republic of Poland who, like the French president, plays an important political role but, unlike the American President, is not the head of executive power, does not need his own reporting, controlling, and executive apparatus. After all, this takes us in the direction of a supra-government resembling the central committees of ruling Communist parties. To be sure, in a democratic system such super-authority would never attain the position of the old Central Committee but such an usurpation would cause a condition of continuous conflict. The usurpation itself would be due to the fact that all structures naturally undertake actions which justify their existence.

Therefore, how is the president supposed to rule? By exercising his powers with regard to state institutions: the government, chambers of parliament, and other organs, as well as arrangements with them and other

nonstate entities, such as parties, trade unions, authoritative organizations, local communities, and so on. Such cooperation does not rule out conflicts. However, conciliation should be the principle. In the course of conciliation, the presidential advantage consists of a mandate received through a popular vote and his personal authority based on the knowledge and understanding of the mechanisms of state, political skills, commonly recognized integrity, and impeccable behavior.

It is hard to develop an unequivocal view if we evaluate Walesa's Presidency from this point of view. However, we should stress as forcefully as possible that in what currently is the main pursuit he duly accomplishes his most significant task: maintaining an arrangement with the government, and primarily with the Bielecki-Balcerowicz tandem. This signifies the protection of the basic reform process. If Lech Walesa succeeds in doing so in the long run this will be a historic accomplishment on a scale of those in 1980 or 1989, though it will be much less spectacular, and someone else will get the Nobel prize this time around.

While playing this difficult and thankless role, Walesa still has not won over his opponents from the time of the presidential campaign who had reasons to fear that he would follow through on his populist promises and destroy the cause of reforms. The president also has to go against his supporters who actually counted on his doing so, taking seriously what he said in the course of the campaign. Therefore, Walesa is now paying the price for his line of action in terms of his credibility.

However, he perhaps also knows that if he runs in elections in 1995 what he says, how he says it, and who he will have arrangements with will not matter. Only the progress which Poland will have made by then will matter.

For the most part, the president has unfortunately encountered failures in other spheres of his domestic policy (his foreign policy has been working out much better). The failures include: the torpedoed project of extensive political representation under the president, the candidacies of Wieslawa Ziolkowska for NIK [Supreme Chamber of Control] chairman and Marek Dabrowski for NBP [National Bank of Poland] chairman rejected by the Sejm, maneuvering concerning the election date, flippant intercessions on behalf of Countess Potocka and the industrialist Grohman, many statements by which he harmed himself, and most of all, the unnecessary conflict with the Sejm over the electoral law which ruins both sides and the entire political system. In the course of this conflict, the president threatened to dissolve the Sejm, for which there were no legal grounds. On this occasion, he once again mounted something of a campaign of hatred and scorn for his former associates, and... lost this contest disastrously!

Immediately thereafter, it turned out that a majority of the public believed that the president was not guided by the good of the country but rather by his political

interests, and that he was not right in this fight. Walesa's ratings plummeted abruptly. Despite subsequent improvements, they have not returned to the level of that spring.

Over this entire period of time, the people of the president did not help him to resolve many matters effectively and did not keep him from making many mistakes. Instead, they drew him into an anti-Sejm campaign which they vigorously promoted because it was in their own political interest. As far as the reform course associated with the person of Leszek Balcerowicz was concerned, the president had to safeguard it spiting his people who even now, right before elections, are trying to replace Balcerowicz with their party comrade Glapinski.

One gets the impression that these president's men do everything except what they are supposed to do. What they are supposed to do is to provide information to the president, develop professional and honest position papers, present reasonable scenarios of decisions and their consequences, and assist in their efficient implementation. Above everything, they are supposed to ensure the sound-free operation of a mechanism warning against mistakes which are inevitable in the absence of such a system. This is what they are getting paid for from the state budget rather than for voicing the opinions of their parties which are in conflict with the position of the president.

Certainly, Walesa is a tough customer. He is self-confident, mistrustful, and often impatient. Therefore, if one cannot work with Walesa successfully he needs to leave in order not to harm Walesa. It is not ruled out that Jacek Merkel has opted for precisely this path; he has given a reason for leaving which is not quite credible, and is inconvenient for him, in order not to bring out into the open differences between him and Lech Walesa. He paid for this by being suspected of cooperation with the SB [Security Service] if not the KGB which is absolutely absurd in the case of a person that honest and without unclear points in his biography.

Meanwhile, Walesa did not respond to this though he should have been the one to demand explanations or show publicly his confidence in an individual to whom he owes so much and with whom he will certainly want to work in the future. By failing to do so, he put a burden on himself. Besides, he made loyal people, with a sense of personal dignity at the same time, reluctant to work with him.

On the other hand, there is Mieczyslaw Wachowski. He is innocent since nothing concerning him has been irrefutably proven. However, a person who draws accusations, even if only slanderous, loses his eligibility to hold a position in which one has to be above all suspicions, even through no fault of his own.

After all, his record cannot but burden his boss, especially given that, as our story suggests, Wachowski sometimes acts for the president by making decisions for him or cutting him off from the sources of information.

Society and the law endow the president with great powers, but they are not given to him as his property: They cannot be ceded to anyone. The electorate voted for Lech Walesa rather than Mieczyslaw Wachowski. The former is responsible for what his aide does or neglects to do.

The apparatus of the president is not an echelon set up by the Constitution, and it should not be a political entity. It is not an organ of power. One can only operate within it if delegated by the head of state. Meanwhile, it is one of the significant locations in political life; it may be a stepping stone to a wonderful career.

While in the apparatus, one learns about the mechanics of power and the modes of exercising it. Important contacts within the country and abroad are established. This is where one should show efficiency, loyalty, and a peculiar elegance in taking care of business—something in which the Kaczynski brothers excelled in 1989 bringing about a coalition with the ZSL [United Peasant Party] and the SD [Democratic Party] and a historical turnaround which the nomination of a government with "our prime minister" turned out to be.

As far as one's own ideas, initiatives, and slogans are concerned, the rules require that they be quietly left to the president. The time to build one's own image is after one leaves the Chancellery.

This suggests that patience and modesty are also among the traits of a president's man. He should not cut corners and hurry because in the long run this does not work.

Walesa, who has not shared the views of his people on many matters for a long time, has been markedly distancing himself from them since the first press conference on the lawn in front of the Belweder Palace. He has promised sizable personnel changes in the chancellery, and he has even embarked on them.

Several days ago, he trounced his consultative committee, which once again set out to depose Balcerowicz and his policy, as if completely unaware of its consultative character and of the fact that the president does not reckon with its advice but holds a fundamentally different view of basic problems.

Had the personal ambitions of the members of the committee corresponded at least in part to their political ambitions they would have already found themselves someone else they could advise.

Profiles, Critiques

They bet on Walesa, proclaiming their antipathy to the so-called Warsaw and the so-called left.... Perhaps, this is all that unites them.

I have selected seven individuals who appear to be performing key functions in the immediate entourage of the president. I also added Jacek Merkel on the assumption that his departure from Belweder is merely a temporary disfavor.

They came to Lech Walesa's side at different times and in different ways.

Lech Kaczynski and Jacek Merkel established contacts with the Free Trade Unions on the coast before August 1980. Lech Walesa came to a training session on labor law which Kaczynski conducted in the spring of 1979.

Arkadiusz Rybicki, one of the leaders of the opposition Young Poland Movement, knew Walesa before August.

PAX [Christian Social Association] journalists Andrzej Drzycimski and Slawomir Siwek became associated with Solidarity in 1980. The former came to the Gdansk Shipyard during the strike as a journalist, and shortly afterwards began to cooperate with Walesa. The latter joined Walesa's entourage recently, when the Chancellery was staffed with the activists of the Center Accord.

The current Secretary of State Mieczyslaw Wachowski was hired as a driver by the Gdansk Solidarity in the fall of 1980. He quickly became the indispensable person for the chairman.

Krzysztof Pusz got involved with Solidarity full tilt in the darkness of the martial law. He has been continuously present at Walesa's side since 1985.

Jaroslav Kaczynski got involved with the KOR [Workers Defense Committee] opposition before August. He played the role of a public, and subsequently underground, expert of the union. For a long time, he remained only "the brother of Lech from Warsaw" for the Solidarity chairman. His cooperation with Walesa dates back to 1988.

The people of the president belong to the Center Accord, the Republican Coalition, and the Liberal Democratic Congress. Some of them are unaffiliated. If they leave the Chancellery they will part ways.

I have talked to several dozen people who have known the characters mentioned in this article well at different times. For the most part, they wished to remain anonymous when they criticized and when they offered praise (it is unpleasant to be accused of flattering the people in power).

Wachowski, They Say

[Photo caption] Mieczyslaw Wachowski, secretary of state, director of the president's office, age and education unknown.

Officially, nothing is known about him. Even the PAP [Polish Press Agency] archives do not have a biographical note which is routinely compiled when a state

appointment is made. I was told at the PAP that "such things are only possible with Belweder."

Wachowski did not agree to talk to GAZETA WYBORCZA, and therefore I must proceed from the reports we have heard.

Zdzislaw Najder who visits Belweder mentioned one figure—the power behind the throne, Mieczyslaw Wachowski, in a questionnaire on "the most influential people in the state" (WPROST). Krzysztof Wyszowski, who until recently billed himself on the pages of TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC as one of the most fervent supporters of Lech Walesa, said the following about Wachowski in "The Events of the Week" on TV: "That vice president and valet de chambre."

Wachowski appeared in Solidarity after the victorious strike, at a time when structures were congealing. He was recommended by the mother of one of the staffers of the Solidarity office who helped Wachowski in the oasis movements.

He drove around as one of the three drivers of the regional chapter, but he soon began to make an overwhelming career. He began associating socially with the activists of the Movement of Young Poland, a group which dated back to the pre-August times and was influential in Gdansk. Very soon, he also became an inseparable friend of the Solidarity chairman.

One of the politicians who visited Gdansk often at the time said: "Walesa liked him for his aggressiveness and for never sucking up to him. He joked about Walesa and told him 'you idiot.' He had a great feel for situation jokes, he hit Walesa's weak points precisely, and due to this he constantly kept Walesa tense and nervous. Walesa performs best when he is concentrating and furious, and he knows that. At the same time, Walesa could relax in his company, he did not feel as constrained as among experts. Wyszowski played a role well known in history, that of a royal jester, who after all could be as impertinent as he wished to His Royal Highness. Walesa kept repeating: 'I will get rid of you, I am getting rid of you right now,' but it was clear that these were only jokes."

A couple months later, Wachowski carried a business card saying "aide to Lech Walesa." At the same time, he was Walesa's driver. He had a compressed air pistol which at the time was an extraordinary rarity.

A person from the close entourage of Walesa at that time said: "Wachowski liked to listen to conversation and stick to more intelligent people. He respected them even if he hated him. He memorized everything even if he did not understand it. Therefore, he reported to Walesa accurately who said what. At the time, there was a tandem which consisted of Andrzej Celinski and Mieczyslaw Wachowski who never parted with the chairman. Wachowski 'talked Celinski's style,' emulating the rhythm of his phrases and his way of drawing out syllables."

When Walesa was brought to Otwock on the night of 13 December, he demanded that Wachowski be kept with him (as he puts it in his autobiography *The Way of Hope*: "As an aide-de-camp or someone of this nature"). To this end, Wachowski was released after being interned for a dozen or so hours in Strzebielinek. However, he was not taken to Walesa, since the chairman did not agree to talk to Rakowski, and it was resolved to punish him.

When Walesa was detained in Arlamow Wachowski helped Mrs. Walesa and played the role of the guardian of the house.

In *The Way of Hope*, Walesa mentions the following people who were the closest to him after his internment ended in the order given: Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Bronisław Geremek, Bożena and Arkadiusz Rybicki, and Mieczysław Wachowski. Walesa writes the following about him: "Mietek Wachowski, a driver and 'stunt-man,' a man for everything with whom we spent a year in Solidarity virtually without parting, and who later during the time of my internment, helped Danuta and played father a little bit to my refractory 'locusts' while he was not that much different from them in temperament. When I came back he continued to be my assistant for everything as before (...). When his third child was born, Mietek who was assailed by the SB, compelled to cooperate—actually, as everyone else, and harassed by phone calls and administrative persecution, devoted himself to the family."

However, those privy to the Walesa household maintained that a big row which Walesa had with Wachowski preceded their parting. Wachowski disappeared and was not seen either at Walesa's name-day parties or in the church of St. Bridget. He worked in a rubber vulcanization shop in Gdynia.

He resurfaced again right before the presidential election. Many people from Walesa's immediate entourage told me that this came as a shock to them. Wachowski was associated with various ventures; to put it mildly, he was not likable, and the people who wished Walesa well had hoped that he had fallen out of Walesa's orbit once and for all.

Minister Mieczysław Wachowski, initially the undersecretary and current the secretary of state, is present at most of the negotiations conducted by the president and takes part in his trips abroad.

He plays ping pong with Walesa for one hour daily. He plays better than anyone. In *The Way of Hope*, Wachowski tells us about the first match with the chairman, at the time of a strike in Jelenia Góra: "Somebody thought of playing ping pong in order to kill time, and I played with Lech. I won once, and I let Lech win once, and this went on. Toward the end, I did not let him win the decisive match, thinking to myself: Let him lose at least once."

I have heard from two independent sources that Wachowski currently has a great influence on military

intelligence and counterintelligence. He maintains continuous, close contacts with Minister of National Defense Rear Admiral Kolodziejczyk. The rumor in the Chancellery has it that conversations between its employees are monitored by military intelligence, and that reports end up on Wachowski's desk. I do not want to believe this, but be that as it may such rumors paint a good picture of relations between the Chancellery and Belweder.

A great many exceptionally unpleasant rumors have always circulated concerning Wachowski anyway. It appears that Lech Walesa has never taken them to heart. Inquiring why the president spends most of his time particularly with Wachowski appeared to be the favorite topic of conversation between the employees of the president. However, for some time this was "a private matter of the Chancellery" until the scandal about how Wachowski removed sentences, on the need to have Soviet troops withdrawn, from Lech Walesa's speech at the headquarters of NATO reverberated "through the city" (for details, see the article by Agnieszka Kublik).

A politician from Walesa's old entourage recalled: "There are certain similarities between Wachowski and Lech—congenital intelligence, gumption, and a lack of education. Certainly, Wachowski did not quite know what the EEC was, but he could learn it very quickly."

A journalist from Gdansk said: "Walesa is secure in his presence. Wachowski will not let on any information, and he will only organize the meetings which the president wants. Walesa was horrified by the weight of responsibilities which devolved on him. He needed someone who was entirely subordinated to him, and who could be used for everything."

A politician whose attitude toward Walesa is hostile said: "The president automatically transplants arrangements from both Solidarity periods: He plays everyone against everyone else. Wachowski is great for that."

In an interview to TYGODNIK BALTYCKI, Father Jankowski said: "There are individuals in the entourage of the president who do not have pertinent qualifications as they reach for appointments and positions because, to put it mildly, their future responsibilities exceed their potential." When I asked him who he meant, Father Jankowski replied: "At present, I am far away, and I can only make statements on the basis of what I see on TV. There are things I do not like, for example, the director of the office who, whenever there is a TV camera around, moves to the forefront, picking up some papers or giving nods. I interpret this as a lack of respect. After all, Belweder is sanctity which the entire world looks at."

Pusz—Nearby, but Dismissed

Those who know him closely praise his virtues. He is lenient, and he would not play dirty tricks on you. He is gruff and kind. He is not a politician type, but rather a

loyal official. He is definitely not a career seeker. However, those who know him only through official contacts complain that he is stiff and conceited.

The three Pusz brothers, assisted by the rest of the family, became involved with Solidarity during the underground period. The Pusz family provided the support base of the Gdansk underground: They harbored Bogdan Lis and cooperated with Bogdan Borusewicz. When underground activists from other cities visited Gdansk they were carefully ferried by the cars of the Puszes and were guests in the apartments of their extensive family.

This was a rich family, what was called private initiative at the time. The Puszes had a lot to lose, and they lost a lot. In 1983, their license to sell garments in the Gdynia market hall was revoked because of their contacts with the underground and resistance to attempts at blackmail by the SB.

After Krzysztof Pusz lost his commercial license, he switched to operating a fox farm, subsequently to working as a caretaker, and finally to driving a taxi, a Mercedes 300D.

People from the underground reminisced: "He knew how to make money, and he knew how to spend it." When he organized underground meetings he bought a pig with his own money and cooked supper.

Jaroslaw Kurski wrote about him: "Personally, he loves cognac and hand of pork. He walks around elegantly dressed, as if a Gypsy baron." They say that Pusz was somewhat offended. Actually, Pusz could be seen for years in a jacket that appeared to be embroidered with gold, and at times wearing a red kerchief, invariably at Walesa's side.

After Lis, Michnik, and Frasiński (who were subsequently sentenced at the so-called Gdansk trial) were arrested in his apartment in February 1985, he began working for Walesa. He was his secretary, and from 1988 on, the chief of the Solidarity office. After the legalization of the union, he was director of the Office of the National Commission of Solidarity and the personal secretary of the chairman.

In October 1990, the well-informed TYGODNIK GDANSKI reported: "Krzysztof Pusz is the most trusted man of Walesa." Zbigniew Gach described what the work of Pusz and others individuals in the closest entourage of the chairman consisted of: "They bring him coffee or periodicals, hand him books to be autographed, and set dates for appointments. They praise successive interviews (even if their standard hovers in the nether regions of mediocrity). They look for syrup when the chairman appears hoarse. They are the sword and the shield against intruders."

Pusz also handled Walesa's personal transactions, supervised the purchase of a house and changing of cars, and took care of a lakeside cottage. The modest country

house of Walesa in the vicinity of the village of Gesiory in the Kaszuby Lakeland is next to the houses of the Pusz family. Mrs. Walesa is friends with Pusz's wife.

One of my interlocutors relayed how he understood what the essence of the court is at some gathering at the Pusz's country house. This was precisely on the name day of one of the brothers. All toasts were said in Walesa's honor.

When his former adjutant Mieczyslaw Wachowski appeared at Walesa's side, his first task to be accomplished was to remove Pusz. Staffers of the Gdansk office of Solidarity told me about the Pusz-Wachowski war. They agreed that the temporary resignation of Pusz and the dismissal of both secretaries were the results of scheming by Wachowski.

I will cite the narration of a person who at the time visited the Solidarity headquarters and the Walesa household: "On the day when the president elect was supposed to leave the headquarters of Solidarity and move to Belweder, he came in as gloomy as a storm cloud. He called in Pusz, and their raised voices were heard from the office. Pusz left, said in passing 'I will not come again,' and picked up his briefcase. The following darted out of Walesa's office in turn: Ms. Zofia, blushing all over, who had heard that she was fired, but had not understood why, and then Joanna, so-called young one, who had learned that she was fired on the absurd charge of too intimate relations with the BOR [Government Security Bureau] guys. Her father threatened to sue because the word got out, and NIE reported that Walesa's secretaries had been fired on account of 'bodily intercourse with the BOR boys.'"

A journalist from Gdansk said: "Wachowski declared war on Pusz, and the latter could not but lose because Wachowski is a strong, mercenary player, whereas Pusz is a decent person. Pusz lost to Wachowski also because you could get things out of him, and Walesa knew that various information was leaked through Pusz."

Pusz and his boss did not remain estranged for long. Apparently, Mrs. Walesa called Mrs. Pusz, and Walesa called Pusz. Pusz was summoned to Warsaw, and despite his threats not to go, did not return from Warsaw. However, he works in the Presidential Chancellery on Wiejska Street rather than in Belweder itself.

Recently, by a decision of the president, Krzysztof Pusz ceased to report to Chief of the Chancellery Jaroslaw Kaczynski, and was subordinated to Director of the Office Mieczyslaw Wachowski.

French Elegance, or Aram Rybicki

[Photo caption] Arkadiusz Rybicki, political adviser to the president with the rank of undersecretary of state, born in 1953, graduate of the Department of History of the University of Gdansk, married, two children, 13 and six.

He belongs to the famous Rybicki clan of Gdansk which consists of eight brothers and sisters.

Prior to August, Bozena led, together with Lech Walesa and Magda Modzelewska, prayers in St. Mary's Church in defense of two jailed activists of the Gdansk opposition and was Walesa's secretary at the time of the first Solidarity. Ewa emigrated to Sweden in February 1982 with her children after her husband compelled the issuance of the permit for their emigration through a hunger strike in a tent in Stockholm. Mirosław (married to Magda Modzelewska) is currently head of a joint venture company and one of the main personalities in the Republican Coalition, Sławomir is chief of the office of the Gdansk voivode, and Jarosław is head of the department of photography at TYGODNIK GDANSKI.

He handed out leaflets in 1968, when he was a high school student. During the December 1970 events, he spoke before the shipyard workers and the residents of Gdansk. In the years 1977 through 1979, he was a member of the Movement for the Defense of Human and Civil Rights (a right-wing opposition group). In 1977, he was a co-founder of the RMP [Movement of Young Poland], a very significant elitist opposition group in Gdansk building on the traditions of national democrats which was headed by Aleksander Hall.

All men in the family were RMP activists. Meanwhile, in the time of the first Solidarity, RMP activists were the organizational pillar next to Walesa—they staffed secretariats, offices, and the Gdansk information office of Solidarity.

All men in the Rybicki family are considered to be elegant and presentable.

Arkadiusz Rybicki supported the strike in the [Gdansk] Shipyard in 1980; subsequently, he worked at Solidarity headquarters. In April 1981, he became chief of the Press Information Bureau of Solidarity (BIPS)—an ambitious though not too successful enterprise.

He was interned in Strzebielinek. Between 1983 and 1988, he was Walesa's personal secretary. One of the habitual guests in Walesa's house told me about Rybicki's departure in 1988: "At the time, Walesa bought a house at Polanki Street. Since he never saw a need to separate political from service functions, he assigned Rybicki to dig the patch. At that point, Aram rebelled and quit."

He returned at the time of the presidential campaign, during which he acted as director of the department of information.

With the help of several other people, Rybicki wrote Walesa's latest book, *Road to Freedom*.

He is running in the current elections on the ticket of the Republican Coalition, a party created right before the elections by people associated with the Movement of Young Poland.

He is responsible for the president's speeches. As his friends in Gdansk maintain, he had a great influence on the speech made in the Israeli parliament in which the president asked for forgiveness on account of Polish anti-Semitism. He is the organizer of the Council for Polish-Jewish Relations of the Republic of Poland president.

In an interview to the weekly WPROST, he clearly outlined his vision of Walesa's Presidency: The president must be given extensive powers because against the background of chaos, yearning for an iron-fist government may develop. This yearning must be anticipated so that "demagogues of various stripes will not take advantage of it." He also stated that "attacks by the president are antagonizing many intellectuals, but we should also be aware of the fact that the time of such individuals is about over."

I hear about Rybicki that he is intelligent, silent, and quiet. One of his friends said: "He has always praised Walesa highly as an effective politician who is needed, but who has his shortcomings. He is gentle, and does not get carried away. Walesa perceives this as a weakness and calls him 'a softie.' He is very different from the rest of the presidential entourage."

Siwek's Career

[Photo caption] Sławomir Siwek, deputy chief of the Presidential Chancellery, chief of the Political Section of the Chancellery, born in 1950, B.A. in economics from the Main School of Planning and Statistics; has a 12-year-old son.

Apparently, Prime Minister Bielecki commented on a statement by Minister Siwek at one of the closed-door meetings of the Office of the Council of Ministers as follows: "Minister has said something nonsensical as usual."

In the Chancellery, Sławomir Siwek is responsible for contacts with the parliament, the government, and church organizations. Only the latter have not been publicly criticized by him.

He worked at SLOWO POWSZECHNE and was a PAX [publishing institution] activist. In 1980 through 1981, he was an activist of PAX Solidarity and editor in chief of the Pax Illustrated Catholic Weekly ZORZA. He was thrown out of the PAX under martial law, and worked in Veritas. He cooperated with KROLOWA APOSTOLOW and ZNAKI CZASU (a periodical published in Vienna by Andrzej Micewski who was close to Primate Glemp) and worked in the Press Bureau of the Episcopate. He was associated with the Dziekania Political Thought Club (which engaged in legal opposition activities in the early 1980's under the direction of Professor Stanisław Stomma). He was active in the Church Agricultural Foundation set up by the Episcopate.

In 1989, he was editor in chief of TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC ROLNIKOW INDYWIDUALNYCH

(WPROST quoted his coworkers as saying that "he ran the company down so thoroughly that there were no pieces to pick up."

He was active in the Association of Polish Journalists. A journalist who served together with Siwek on the Warsaw Council of the Association of Polish Journalists said: "He always appeared to be the personification of mediocrity. He did not say stupid things, but rather banalities which were of no interest to anyone."

He is a co-founder of the Center Accord (member of the Political Council), chairman of the board of the Solidarity Foundation consisting of the activists of the Center Accord which publishes the Warsaw EXPRESS WIECZORNY and the weekly CENTRUM, and member of the board of the Cargo-Modlin Economic Association.

This is how he commented on his appointment at Belweder in EXPRESS WIECZORNY: "This was a sign of confidence in a certain political option on the part of Lech Walesa, an option which is ideologically the closest to the president."

Minister Siwek is doing everything in order to turn the Sejm and the government against himself and, therefore, the president. In the interviews he frequently gives, he disowns both of these institutions. As far as the government is concerned, he says openly that it has already played its role.

Siwek is accused of coming out against the government and the parliament as a Center Accord politician rather than a representative of the presidential office.

He is known primarily for ostentatiously walking out of the Sejm in March, when he presented the presidential draft electoral law. He resented the words of a PSL [Polish Peasant Party] deputy about "the plotters of the elector of Prussia who arrived in Warsaw riding gray horses and chestnut mares in order to throw the Sejm into confusion." He was also wounded by a mistake made by Marshal Kozakiewicz. He believed that calling him Siwak was not merely an innocent slip of the tongue on the part of Kozakiewicz but a reference to the infamous representative of party hardliners, Albin Siwak.

Jaroslav Kaczynski: The Rise and the Fall

[Photo caption] Jaroslav Kaczynski, minister of state, chief of the Presidential Chancellery, senator from Gdansk Voivodship, born in 1949, Ph.D. in law from the University of Warsaw, single, eight cats.

Prior to August 1980, he cooperated with the Assistance Bureau of the KSS KOR [Social Self-Defense Committee KOR] and was a member of the editorial board of GLOS, the publication in which Antoni Macierewicz (currently one of the leaders of the ZChN [Christian National Association]) played a leading role.

After August 1980, he was a trade union expert; he worked in the Center for Social Research of Solidarity Mazowsze. Under martial law, he became a member of the underground Helsinki Committee and worked together with the underground leadership of Solidarity. He was not widely known; he did not distinguish himself among the leaders of the union in Warsaw, and in Gdansk he was known as "a brother from Warsaw."

The career of Jaroslav Kaczynski took off during strikes at the Gdansk Shipyard in 1988. At the time, he grew very close to Walesa. In 1989, he became one of the secretaries of the Solidarity national leadership.

There has always been animosity between the advisers of the chairman from Gdansk and Warsaw. The Kaczynski brothers continued to stick with Walesa when political life shifted to a great extent from Gdansk to Warsaw after the elections were won in 1989 and the old advisers from Warsaw had less and less time to travel to Gdansk.

Initially, Walesa tapped Jaroslav Kaczynski as marshal of the Senate, but he allowed himself to be persuaded that a more sober-minded individual should perform this function. The Kaczynski brothers were seldom present at the meetings of the Senate; instead, a powerful decision-making center emerged in Gdansk consisting of Walesa, the Kaczynski brothers, and Jacek Merkel.

The Kaczynski brothers conducted negotiations on the issue of forming the first non-Communist government as Walesa's authorized representatives. It appeared obvious to the chairman that the two brothers and Jacek Merkel would become its members. Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki did not include them in the cabinet and ruled out the use of the Kaczynski brothers as intermediaries between him and Walesa.

When the topic of Walesa becoming president was brought out for the first time in interviews to the press which the two brothers simultaneously gave to two different newspapers in April 1990, Walesa told a PAP journalist: "The Kaczynskis have done me a disservice." This is how a period began in which it appeared that Jaroslav Kaczynski was pushing Walesa to become president, to reinforce the right leg of the table, and to finally part ways with advisers from Warsaw—though it is not known which one was the driving force. In fairness to Kaczynski, we must say that at the time he proved to be an exceptionally efficient politician.

He set up the Center Accord. He thought up many catchy slogans: acceleration, de-Communization, and combating corruption. He became a professional politician, a firm and persistent one (he prevented an alliance between the Center Accord and the ZChN despite many ties between the two organizations at the local level). He learned good public oratory and how to lead the party efficiently. He is a master of insinuation: He refers to the Democratic Union as "the UD [sounding close to UB, the Security Administration] crowd," refers to its "alliance with post-Communist forces," and suggests that

some secret agreements have been entered into somewhere, about which he knows but cannot divulge.

Early in his Presidency, the Center Accord was Walesa's main base. Walesa is beginning to retreat from that little by little. He did not go along with the odd concept of the Center Accord politicians that he should be the president of some Poles only; he is talking about de-politicizing his Chancellery after the elections. They say that he will soon get rid of Jaroslaw Kaczynski (however, knowing Walesa, these partings are never for good).

Jaroslaw Kaczynski was one of the main shareholders in the Telegraf company. The politicians of the Center Accord were its exclusive founders and members of the original Council of Trustees and Board (among others, Lech Kaczynski served on the council). Let us recall that the state bank invested more than 11 billion zlotys into the company (the Center Accord politicians disposed of their shares when they became state officials). Kaczynski also was one of the founders of the Solidarity Press Foundation which purchased EXPRESS WIECZORNY on behalf of the Center Accord, and publishes the Center Accord magazine TYGODNIK CENTRUM. At present, he serves on the Council of Trustees of the Economic Association Cargo-Modlin in which the Solidarity Press Foundation has an interest. Cargo-Modlin will certainly submit a bid to build an airfield in Modlin; meanwhile, Minister of State Kaczynski has spoken publicly about the need to build this airfield.

It is rare for a politician to rise to a position that high within a short period of time; it is also rare for him to go down that fast. In a CBOS [Center for Public Opinion Research] survey for July of this year, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, Politician of the Year 1990, was ranked last of the statesmen: 16 percent of favorable ratings, and 55 percent of negative ratings.

He did not foresee (and why?) that people would want to hold him accountable for the promises he made to them. It appears that the resentment of President Walesa's electorate on account of their dashed hopes for a prompt better future is now focused on him. Jaroslaw Kaczynski is certainly aware that the president may throw him to the wolves without much regret. As a politician who has learned a lot in the past two years, he must have his following move prepared—it would be interesting to know in which direction.

Kaczynski, Kaczynski's Brother

[Photo caption] Lech Kaczynski, appointed minister of state for state security and national defense in March of this year to replace Jacek Merkel, senator from Elblag Voivodship, born in 1949, Ph.D. in law from the University of Gdansk, married, one child.

During one of the 1988 strikes, Lech Walesa introduced Lech Kaczynski as follows in the famous canteen of the Gdansk Shipyard: "I recommend him to you wholeheartedly! He is a great lawyer and an outstanding

specialist on labor law. He is my personal attorney; he represented me in all of my lawsuits, and he lost them all."

He worked with the Free Trade Unions of the Coast even before August. He gave legal advice, and was nicknamed "Paragraph."

During the first Solidarity, he was a trade union activist and the legal counselor of the Independent Association of Students. He was associated with the "Constellation" ["Gwiazdozbior"] (a group which derived its name from the last name of Joanna and Andrzej Gwiazda; among other things, it came out in defense of intra-union democracy, accusing Walesa of dictatorial inclinations).

He was interned in Stzebielinek. He took part in the operation of regional and national underground structures. After Walesa's release, he was among several of his closest associates in Gdansk. He took part in the Round-table negotiations and the so-called little meets (negotiating sessions with the Communists with a limited number of participants).

Together with his brother, he was an architect of the sensational coalition Walesa-Jozwiak (SD)-Malinowski (ZSL) as a result of which the Mazowiecki government was created. When the new prime minister offered Jacek Kuron the Ministry of Labor, Kuron asked: "Why not Lech Kaczynski?" (Kaczynski is an outstanding expert on labor law). However, Mazowiecki positively did not want to have either brother in the government.

In 1989 and 1990, when Walesa was Solidarity chairman, Lech Kaczynski actually ran the union. Kaczynski approached the chairman only when a decision called for his support. Frequently, he heard Walesa say on these occasions: "Why are you bothering me with this bullshit?" In an interview, Jaroslaw Kaczynski said that his brother had frequent quarrels with Walesa. At times, they did not speak to each other for weeks, despite working in adjacent offices.

After Walesa left for Belweder, he ran in elections for Solidarity chairman. He survived until the last round together with Krzaklewski, losing to the latter. Some of the delegates were scared away by his political affiliation: Lech Kaczynski did not enlist in the Center Accord but he never concealed that he and his brother subscribe to common views. Within the regional chapter, he and his closest associates were considered to be a quasi-network of the Center Accord. They traveled through the regions as Solidarity functionaries, taking care of their party business. When Lech Kaczynski resigned from the office of deputy chairman his associates disappeared from the union.

It was planned to make Lech Kaczynski chief of the socio-economic committee that would oversee Balcerowicz in the government which the Center Accord attempted to form after the presidential election (Jan Olszewski was supposed to become prime minister).

Lech Kaczynski said the following about his relations with Walesa: "I have no illusions as to the fact that Lech will also use me and Jarek. I like Lech in my own way. However, I have no doubts that, even if he likes me—I do not know, but if push comes to shove he will have no scruples" (from the book *The Leader* by Kurski).

His associate of long duration stated: "He is an outstanding second-echelon personality. He does not have a sense of humor, but he does have great ambitions. He sees life as a duty to be upwardly mobile."

However, most of my interlocutors stressed Kaczynski's numerous virtues: He is competent, intelligent, quiet, honest, and incredibly hard-working. His political adversaries added after this series of superlatives that unfortunately he subscribes to the same Machiavellian vision of politics as his brother—the end justifies the means.

Spokesman Drzycimski

[Photo caption] Andrzej Drzycimski, press spokesman of the president, 49, a doctorate in history, essayist, married, two daughters.

He comes from a Pomeranian peasant family. He is hard-working, honest, and composed. He has written several books (about Major Sucharski, about internment, and about papal pilgrimages) but he has not become famous as a writer or essayist. Together with Adam Kinaszewski, he co-authored the dull and hagiographic *Way of Hope*, which is known as the autobiography of Lech Walesa.

Drzycimski, a journalist from SLOWO POWSZECHNE, the PAX organ, appeared in the Gdansk Shipyard on 17 August 1980. Together with a group of other young PAX journalists, he cooperated with the press bureau of the Solidarity chairman after the strike. He was the deputy of Lech Badkowski, Walesa's press spokesman.

While not widely known, he was already in the close entourage of Walesa at the time. He went with the chairman to France, Italy, and Japan. He was interned in the Strzebielinek camp (he wrote *Internment Diaries* together with Adam Kinaszewski under the joint pen-name Jan Mur). He was active in the Ministry to Artistic Communities at the monastery of Dominican monks in Gdansk, and organized meetings with Walesa there. He became the press spokesman for the chairman after Jaroslaw Kurski left.

This is how Adam Kinaszewski commented on his transfer to the position of spokesman in GAZETA GDANSKA: "He is a Catholic figure undoubtedly enjoying the confidence of Bishop Tadeusz Goclowski; Walesa certainly wants the good will of the bishop of Gdansk very much."

Drzycimski revealed his philosophy of relations with his employer in ZYCIE WARSZAWY: "As president, Lech Walesa is a marvelous boss. When a coworker comes to him with a question about what to do on a particular

issue, he says: This is your turf. If you do well, you will have my praise, if you do badly you leave. This is a simple and transparent system. I liken myself to a military engineer. I defuse various mines, and I know that eventually one of them will blow. This is how it should be in politics. He who makes a political mistake should leave."

He speaks in a well-considered manner due to which his statements frequently differ from the presentations of the employees of the Chancellery or the presidential advisory committee. His language is the opposite of Walesa's: There are no colloquialisms, but there is no humor or flair either. There is a lot of newspeak instead: "a thinly disguised political provocation and manipulation" (about retirees converging on Belweder).

Jacek Merkel—The Eternal Yo-Yo

[Photo caption] Jacek Merkel, chairman of the Solidarity board of Chase Bank S.A., deputy, born in 1954, naval architect, a mathematician wife, three daughters who are 10, eight, and five.

On 12 March of this year, he resigned from the Presidential Chancellery in which he had held the post of the minister of state for defense and state security "in view of fatigue due to conducting the election campaign and organizing a new office."

Merkel's sudden resignation caused numerous comments. The president himself hinted unofficially about some papers which were supposed to have caused an immediate response on his part. In the Belweder spheres, they refer to meetings which Merkel held in 1988 and 1989 being revealed—from here on, there are two versions: with the resident agents of Soviet intelligence or with the functionaries of our own SB.

The circulation of such gossip caused the American newspaper WASHINGTON TIMES to report that rumors were flying in Warsaw to the effect that Jacek Merkel—a Solidarity activist whose work in the union was highly praised on its merits by all—had turned out to be a KGB informant.

We should not by any means draw the conclusion from the entire affair that the political career of Merkel is over. Immediately thereafter, he became much more active in the Sejm. He was also elected to the leadership of the KLD [Liberal Democratic Congress] (he will run for deputy on the KLD ticket).

Nor should we conclude that the political career of Merkel at Walesa's side is over. On the contrary, I heard from a politician associated with the president that Merkel may be Walesa's likeliest proposal for the prime minister's job.

Walesa's game with Merkel irresistibly resembles the children's game of yo-yo: Walesa lets him fall as if on a rope in order to pull him up again in a second. Merkel

who has been thrust away and returned to favor many times has always displayed extraordinary mental resilience.

As many of his acquaintances say in unison, his cold view of reality, and especially of Walesa is helpful in this matter. A politician associated with the president said: "Merkel does not go against facts, and he knew that Walesa would win. Merkel does not think much of him but respects his position." One of Merkel's friends, currently belonging to another political camp, said: "He does not have a personal, warm feeling toward Lech. This was a calculated choice. He believed that the Presidency is where Walesa could do the least harm to Poland, that he would be the most dangerous outside of the power structure."

Jacek Merkel maintained contacts with the activists of the Free Trade Unions of the Coast even before August 1980. He worked at the Gdansk Shipyard as an engineer and took an active part in the August strike. In 1981, he was one of the pillars of the Network of Key Enterprises and the youngest member of the national leadership of Solidarity.

As his attorney said, during more than a year of his internment in Strzebielinek, he spent time actively jogging in the walking yard.

After internment, he was thrown out of his job at the shipyard and subsequently the Polish Academy of Sciences. He found employment at the Church of St. Elizabeth in Gdansk as a [grounds] keeper.

He was responsible for international contacts in the underground structures of Solidarity. He has been a close associate of Walesa since 1984. He led the strike in the Gdansk shipyards in August 1988, and subsequently he became head of the MKO [Inter-Enterprise Organizational Committee]. At the time, Walesa said that he wanted to retire and go fishing, and that Jacek Merkel should become his successor in the office of Solidarity chairman.

Along with several other localities in Poland in which strikes broke out in 1988, a jurisdictional conflict developed between a new union leadership brought forth by the strikes and the old underground structures. Merkel picked a fight with Borusewicz, head of the Solidarity Regional Commission, for the rule of Solidarity souls. Walesa put an end to the dispute publicly putting Merkel in his place: "Are you really democratically elected? As it is, I elected you MKO chairman because I had sent Lis to handle strikes in Silesia and I did not have anyone else handy at the shipyard." The MKO thus ended its existence, and Walesa stopped saying that he would entrust Solidarity to Merkel.

One of the observers of political life in Gdansk told me with amazement about a flip-flop which Merkel accomplished in 1988. At first, he rallied around himself the strong anti-Walesa opposition in Gdansk consisting of mid-level enterprise activists. Subsequently, he disarmed

this opposition by reorganizing it into the MKO and subordinating the latter to Walesa. He was not at all rewarded for doing so.

After the legalization of Solidarity, Merkel was elected to the presidium of the national authorities of the union. He organized the second congress of Solidarity.

He was the head of the effectively conducted election campaign of Lech Walesa. Later, he got to hear from Walesa that it was Merkel's fault that a run-off was necessary. It appeared once again that Merkel's career was over.

However, the first personnel decision of the president elect was to appoint Merkel chief of the Chancellery. Jaroslaw Kaczynski took over this position from him when Merkel was appointed secretary of state and head of the newly established National Security Council. He began his tenure quite unfortunately, by promising to repeal a regulation which exempted sole providers for their families from military service.

He is chairman of the Council of the Economic Fund of the NSZZ Solidarity and the Council of the Economic Foundation of Solidarity.

He was one of the few OKP [Citizens Parliamentary Club] deputies to vote against amendments in the electoral law proposed by the president. He told PRZEGŁAD TYGODNIOWY: "I voted against a dangerous precedent whereby the Sejm, by accepting the amendments proposed, would recognize the Presidential Chancellery as a place where law is created."

The people who are ill disposed toward him and those who cordially watch him make his career mention the same traits of Merkel in unison: extremely intelligent, ambitious, enterprising, hard working, competent, a perfect organizer, has a feel for politics, and knows English perfectly.

All who I have talked to agree that Jacek Merkel has a great political career before him.

Minus Fourteen

The Presidential Chancellery was included in the survey for the first time in a CBOS poll taken in late August. It ranked 10th on the list of the 12 public institutions in the survey with a negative balance of minus 14 points which result from 32 percent of approving responses and 46 percent of disapproving responses.

In an excerpt from a book-interview recently printed in POLITYKA, Andrzej Celinski writes: "Walesa is surrounded by mediocre people, even if intelligent. They are mediocre because they care more about their own position or that of their parties than they do about the state. He has all of them under his thumb because they are nothing without him. However, their work is of little use too."

Office Structure, Philosophy

Slawomir Siwek calls the Chancellery the "office of services to the president," and the officials "presidential aides who carry out Walesa's instructions."

Under the Constitution, the president, among other things, calls elections to the parliament, and appoints and recalls plenipotentiary representatives of the Republic of Poland abroad. He is the chief of the Armed Forces, heads the Committee for the Defense of the Country, submits the candidacies of prime minister and National Bank of Poland chairman to the Sejm, may convene meetings of the government in an emergency, may submit draft legislation to the Sejm, and may veto laws adopted by the Sejm. The president awards orders, decorations, and honorary titles, grants clemency, and ratifies and repudiates international treaties.

The Presidential Chancellery assists the head of state in the course of it all.

The Chancellery employs 507 people, from drivers to the leadership of the office. One hundred and sixty-five persons are employed in so-called essential positions. The leadership of the Chancellery proper consists of 16 people: two ministers of state (Lech and Jaroslaw Kaczynski), three deputy chiefs of the Chancellery (Antoni Pietkiewicz, Jerzy Breitkopf, and Slawomir Siwek), seven secretaries of state (Andrzej Drzycimski, Grzegorz Grzelak, Teresa Liszcz, Jerzy Milewski, Mieczyslaw Wachowski, Maciej Zalewski, and Janusz Ziolkowski), two undersecretaries of state (Krzysztof Pusz and Arkadiusz Rybicki), and two plenipotentiary representatives of the president (Jerzy Grohman—for privatization, and Wojciech Wlodarczyk, secretary of the Presidential Advisory Committee).

Jaroslaw Kaczynski, Slawomir Siwek, Teresa Liszcz, and Maciej Zalewski are members of the Center Accord. Grzegorz Grzelak and Arkadiusz Rybicki belong to the Republican Coalition. Krzysztof Pusz admits to sympathizing with the Gdansk Liberals; Wojciech Wlodarski is a member of the National Citizens Committee.

About one-half of the leadership proper of the Chancellery are candidates for the future parliament: the Kaczynskis, Siwek, Liszcz, Zalewski, Grohman, and Wlodarczyk on the ticket of the Center Citizens Accord, and Arkadiusz Rybicki on the ticket of the Republican Coalition.

The Chancellery operates between 0900 and 1600 hours. Secretaries and ministers of state are in the office from 0900 to 2200 hours, or even longer. Siwek said: "We live here."

The Chancellery is located in a four-story building on Wiejska Street, across the street from the new Sejm hotel. The parliament, the Office of the Council of Ministers, and Belweder are nearby.

The Chancellery is elegantly appointed: The corridors are carpeted (beige and brown "spotted" design, or

orange and crimson clover leaves), the curtains are white, and there is plenty of greenery. There is silence and quiet here during business hours.

The suites of the leadership consist of the secretariat, a large room for official duties, and a little salon for receiving guests. The entry to the bathroom is from the salon.

All suites look the same: There are state emblems on the walls, landscapes in gilded frames, soft armchairs, sofas, and heavy gold drapes on the windows. There is a desk for work, a "conference" table, and an entire set of telephones: several internal lines, the government circuit, and a telephone without a dial which connects one to Walesa when the headset is lifted (and the other way around, which Walesa uses scrupulously).

The cafeteria is open between 1300 and 1500 hours. Lunch costs between 10,000 and 15,000 zlotys. Throughout the day, sandwiches, coffee, tea, or something cold may be ordered for delivery to the suite, of course, at one's own expense.

One From the Old *Nomenklatura*

The operation of the Chancellery is regulated by the charter given to it by General Jaruzelski. Walesa has changed only one point: He has added to the list of individuals "with whose help the chief of the Chancellery manages the office" (the first deputy chief of the Chancellery, secretaries and undersecretaries of state, and general directors have been added to the deputy chiefs of the Chancellery, presidential advisers, office directors, and section chiefs). However, he has removed chief of his office Mieczyslaw Wachowski and chief of the Press Bureau Andrzej Drzycimski from the jurisdiction of the chief of the Chancellery and subordinated them directly to himself.

Support personnel such as secretaries, drivers, and janitors remain from the old team. Antoni Pietkiewicz, first deputy chief of the Chancellery responsible for personnel policy, maintains that almost nobody remains from the old *nomenklatura*. As Walesa publicly talks the people into "purging," he gives an example from his own backyard: "I have only one person from the old *nomenklatura* in my office." This refers to Jerzy Breitkopf, deputy chief of the Chancellery. Breitkopf has worked in the Chancellery (previously, the Chancellery of the Council of State) since 1952. He was chief of the Chancellery between 1984 and 1989.

A Day Like Any Other

In the morning, all officials are driven to Wiejska by official Lancias. Their official activities involve receiving guests, reading official notes, signing a multitude of papers, and making decisions. Also, there are meetings and conferences, conferences and meetings. Siwek said: "The course of the day depends on how talkative our interlocutors are. Some manage to be done in as little as 20 minutes." He added to the above list of

occupations official dinners and receptions. He explained: "Politics does not consist of official statements only."

The political leadership of the Chancellery gathers together once a week. Pietkiewicz maintained that in principle these are not policy discussions but an exchange of information on what has been accomplished and what will be done in the following week. Conferences with the president are not the custom. Pietkiewicz said: "This is not necessary. The president has no hang-ups, and calls whenever he needs us. He frequently calls, for example, employees of the transportation pool without the help of his secretary. He is impatient, and cannot stand official channels."

The chief of the Presidential Chancellery Jaroslaw Kaczynski meets Walesa on a daily basis. He goes to Belweder before he comes to the office, around 1000 hours. Siwek said: "He brings us directives from the Belweder."

Other highly placed officials also have frequent contacts with the president. Since they ascertained that Walesa's decisions relayed by Wachowski in the name of the president are not at all Walesa's decisions, they have preferred to give documents for signing to the president in person or outline their position to him on the phone (beginning with the undersecretaries of state, each has "a hog," a phone without a dial, on his desk).

This is what Pusz said about his contacts with the president: "I come as if to my own office and do not have to explain myself to anyone. I see him two to three times a week because I prefer to arrange many things with him personally, without any go-betweens." Along with Pusz, Wachowski, Drzycimski, and the Kaczynski brothers address the president in the familiar form.

Rybicki, who is responsible for political service, has so far prepared about 250 texts of speeches, letters, and messages. Rybicki said: "Writing a letter to, for example, Gorbachev requires that, among others, the minister of foreign affairs and the head of the National Security Bureau be consulted. We should also know the latest statements by Walesa and Gorbachev."

Pusz, who ties the trips of the president with a bow, works differently. He said about his work: "I do not sit behind my desk. Before his trips, I must check out the territory (in cooperation with the Government Security Bureau). I send my people over, or if need be, go myself. I coordinate all actions." Pusz also organizes receptions given by the president. He said that he would gladly give up compiling the guest list. "They call me and beg to be given an invitation, but I cannot because I simply do not have any more seats." The invitation pattern is simple: the Presidential Chancellery, the Sejm, the Senate (the presidium, chiefs of commissions), the government (once again, not all), and church dignitaries.

"It is a myth that the Center Accord governs the Chancellery," said Siwek, a member of the Center Accord

leadership. However, one-fourth of the leadership proper of the Chancellery consists of the members of the leadership of that party.

Siwek, whom a journalist from GLOS SZCZECINSKI asked about this, said: "I view my presence in this office as appreciation of the role which the Center Accord played in the election process. However, this is not at all to say that the president has become a president of one party. The Center Accord has differences with the president on many issues, which the Center Accord has stated publicly. My thinking is that Lech Walesa selected people who understand his program and want to help him."

Siwek stressed that he is a loyal employee: "I have proof of that. When the president received Tyminski, as an official I had to explain why he was received, despite thinking privately that Walesa did so prematurely." He said that he had resolved to focus on work in the Chancellery rather than on "party work." He added: "In my party, they say that I am of no use to them. Perhaps, they will ultimately expel me."

In late July, Walesa said: "The selection of ministers for the Chancellery was due to the need to balance post-Communist and other forces. The transformation into a non-political Chancellery will now occur." Siwek maintained that "the Chancellery cannot be anything but political because the president engages in politics."

Pusz said that there are too many Center Accord members among the leadership of the office: "They are playing their Center Accord game." However, Siwek qualified this: "I do not represent the party in the Chancellery; I am an aide to the president, and I carry out his instructions. It is not true that we make policy; the president makes policy himself."

The Belweder Group

Secretary of State Mieczyslaw Wachowski, Secretary for Economic Affairs Andrzej Kozakiewicz, Press Spokesman of the President Andrzej Drzycimski (the Press Bureau of the government is located in Belweder), and personal chaplain and confessor of the president Father Franciszek Cybula are the people closest to Walesa in Belweder.

A chapel was built in the basement of Belweder in the beginning of the Presidency. This is where a half-hour Holy Mass is said between Monday and Friday daily at 0730 hours. The following pray with the president: Wachowski, Drzycimski, several BOR employees, and on occasion kitchen maids and janitors from Belweder.

A ping pong hall is also located in the basement of Belweder. This is where Walesa spends an hour almost daily. Wachowski is his most frequent adversary. They say that the president always wins.

Drzycimski, Wachowski, Father Cybula, and Kozakiewicz carry on themselves devices which make it possible for Walesa to summon them at any time. The device indicates the number of the phone from which Walesa is calling, and it is necessary to call this number back immediately.

When I tried to prevail upon Wachowski to talk he replied: "I do not have any interesting topics for GAZETA WYBORCZA." I asked him whether in this case he would resent it if I wrote about him. He said "We did not talk," and proceeded down a Belweder hallway.

Wachowski spends the most time with the president, and as Rybicki put it, has "statistically the greatest influence" on him.

This is what Lech Kaczynski said about influence on the president: "I had influence on Walesa only in specific matters. At present, I cannot claim great influence on issues which I handle in the Chancellery (security and defense of the country)."

Drzycimski denied that Wachowski has influence on Walesa. In his opinion, Walesa makes decisions himself and is absolutely independent. He said: "This should be defined differently. Walesa reckons with the opinions of very many people, among others, the prime minister and the Kaczynski brothers. However, he makes decisions himself."

According to Pusz, "the president listens to all but does things his own way anyhow." Rybicki stressed: "It is a myth that Walesa is bossed by his advisers." However, both believed that if there is anybody at all who can influence Walesa it is Wachowski.

Drzycimski laughed when I said that Wachowski is "the power behind the throne" or, as others would say, "No. 2 in Belweder." Drzycimski said: "Indeed, the power behind the throne because he is the power for mundane work. He has devoted himself entirely to serving Walesa, without advancing himself personally in the process and without asking what he would get in return, giving up a great job, family, and the household. This man must talk to everyone who wants to talk to Walesa. Everything devolves on him."

Rybicki called Wachowski "a person who must say no." He added: "This is not a pleasant job."

Does Wachowski have influence on the president? Only Drzycimski said that he does not. The rest of the close associates of the president said that Wachowski makes decisions on foreign and domestic policy, and naturally they were not happy with this.

This is what Lech Kaczynski said: "His influence is certainly greater than the functions he performs." Other employees of the Chancellery replied quite enigmatically when asked about working with Wachowski: "Our relations with him are not what they should be," "I would prefer a lawyer to take his place."

Relations between the Chancellery and Belweder were aggravated when Walesa appointed Wachowski secretary of state. They say in the Chancellery that initially Walesa did not agree to Wachowski's appointment, but the latter wrote it up himself and finally begged the president into signing it.

Since that time, an open war has been waged between Wachowski and the Chancellery.

They say that the Kaczynski brothers and Siwek are prepared to resign at any moment. The president is supposedly holding them back by assuring them that everything will change after the elections.

I asked an employee of the Chancellery: Will Walesa resolve to remove Wachowski? "He would have to find someone foolish enough to be with him around the clock, put on his slippers for him, and laugh at the president's jokes when necessary."

Wachowski is the author of Walesa's famous saying: "I am in favor and even against." This phrase alone proves how well he understands Walesa. This is why the president feels so good in Wachowski's company.

In early July, during a visit by the head of state to the NATO headquarters, Wachowski resolved to take our eastern policy into hand. This episode, which several people told me about, resembles scenes from political fiction by Robert Ludlum.

The protocol for visits provides that the president with his personal secretary rides in car No. 1. No. 2 is an empty car. The more cars there are the better the president's security. Car No. 3 is intended for the most important member of the delegation after the president, depending on the place and level of the visit. However, this time the president and Minister of State for Security Lech Kaczynski were to be driven to the NATO Headquarters in car No. 1. However, Wachowski took a seat in this car first. Under the circumstances, Kaczynski got into car No. 3. While en route, Wachowski omitted the last passage from the presidential speech, prepared together with Minister of Foreign Affairs Skubiszewski.

According to the text handed out to journalists ahead of time, this is how Walesa was supposed to finish his speech at the NATO Headquarters: "However, we cannot conceal the truth (about relations between Poland and the USSR—editorial note). Problems exist which cast a shadow over our cooperation. Despite our efforts and our flexibility in negotiations, the withdrawal of Soviet troops stationed in Poland is still out of the question. The USSR proposes remote deadlines and a slow pace of withdrawal of these troops. Such a policy with regard to a sovereign Poland is unacceptable. We are awaiting a favorable breakthrough which will be important for improving the security atmosphere throughout the continent."

A scandal broke out, all the more resounding because all agencies released to the world the end of the speech

which Walesa did not read. They say that upon returning to Warsaw Walesa had a terrible row with Wachowski. There were no witnesses. NATO ministers were dissatisfied with the omission of the ending of the speech. They were apprehensive about international public opinion accusing them of inducing the Polish president to withhold the passage directly attacking the USSR.

Why did Wachowski do this? In the Chancellery, they said: "He believed that our policy with regard to the USSR should be more cautious."

Therefore, are we justified in thinking that Wachowski has an influence on Polish foreign policy? The response was: "This is hard to determine unambiguously. All that is known is that, as a person closest to the president, he has unlimited access to all secret and confidential reports of our intelligence and counterintelligence without such authorization."

Wachowski takes part in Walesa's most confidential conversations. He always accompanies him during working breakfasts.

Many people in the Chancellery told me that they would simply give up their jobs if Wachowski continued to rule in Belweder.

Poles Rediscover Own Experience as Expellees

92EP0004A Munich SUEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG
in German 20 Sep 91 p 9

[Article by Thomas Urban: "Expellees of All Countries, Communicate! With Poles' Visits to Their Former Homelands in Lithuania, Byelorussia, or the Ukraine Comes Growing Understanding for German Expellees"]

[Text] Wroclaw—"The Lithuanians have leveled our graves and changed the name of our great poet Mickiewicz to Mickievicius," an older Polish tourist who had just returned from Vilnius, the Lithuanian capital, said with agitation. He was born in Vilnius, the city where the romanticist Adam Mickiewicz studied; Czeslaw Milosz, the Polish Nobel laureate in literature, also comes from there. Just as the tourist now living in Wroclaw, in recent years several hundred thousand Poles have visited the areas in Lithuania, Byelorussia, and of the western Ukraine which were part of their country prior to World War II. For decades Poles were able to visit their USSR-annexed homeland, which they had to leave in 1945-46, with great difficulty after exhausting struggle with the Soviet authorities.

A Strict Taboo in the Past

About 5 million Poles were compulsorily resettled after World War II. Stalin kept one-third of the former Polish state territory which the Red Army had occupied based on the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in September 1939. During the party rule in Poland this topic was strictly taboo, just as, on the other side, the evacuation of the German eastern territories. The Poles who had to leave

their homeland were euphemistically called repatriates, the expulsion of the Germans was briefly treated as "humane resettlement according to international agreements."

But since the Polish change in Warsaw two years ago a flood of books have been published on the "Soviet-Polish war" of 1939, on the deportation and murder of hundreds of thousands of Poles in the territories occupied by the Red Army, including on the Katyn murders of officers, finally on the resettlement after World War II, which to some extent was hardly any less brutal than the expulsion of the Germans from Silesia, Pomerania, West Prussia, and East Prussia during the same period. In the meantime Polish journalists and historians are also becoming interested in precisely this expulsion of the Germans.

Thus parallels are now being discovered through which mutual understanding develops. In an analysis of Poland's relations with its neighbors in the East and West, the respected weekly POLITYKA briefly noted: "Poles and Germans have to grapple with the same events: the involuntary shifting of the borders to the west, the forcible resettlement connected therewith of millions of people, and the suppression of those left behind who still number in the hundreds of thousands."

Minorities on Both Sides

The German minority in Poland comprises several hundred thousand people; about 300,000 have joined the German Friendship Circles [DFK] registered since the beginning of 1990. More than half of them live in the eastern part of Opole Voivodship in Upper Silesia. The Polish minority in Lithuania numbers about 200,000, the majority of them reside in an almost closed settlement area south of Vilnius, but even in the Lithuanian capital every fifth inhabitant calls Polish his mother tongue. At least 100,000 Poles live in Byelorussia; their number in the Western Ukraine is estimated to be half a million.

For the Germans in Poland, public use of their mother tongue in the postwar years was a punishable offense. They were regarded as Hitlerites who had to bear the responsibility for the German war crimes. German inscriptions on monuments and buildings were removed, most cemeteries were leveled. Later on, even the existence of the entire ethnic group was denied. In socialist Poland the Germans just as those among the Upper Silesians who consider themselves between both cultures, were simply assigned the designation, "autochthons," natives. The German first names were Polonized, Hans became Jan; Waldemar, Wlodzimierz; and Margaretha, Malgorzata—the last names, at least in their spelling, were made to conform to Polish: Schulz became Szulc; Strohmeyer became Sztramajer.

In the meantime the fate of the Poles in the Soviet Union was not much different. Although their personal identity cards listed their nationality as "Polish," a Wlodzimierz had to accept being called Vladimir, just as Jan was often

changed to Ivan. Until a year ago, instructions in school in the mother tongue for the minorities was out of the question in Poland as well as in the Soviet Union.

Now since hundreds of thousands of Poles have visited their birthplaces in Vilnius (Polish: Wilno) or Lvov (Polish: Lwow; Russian: Lvov; Ukrainian: Lviv), understanding for the "nostalgia tourism" from the Federal Republic is also growing. Whereas Polish tourist guides in the past spoke with grim consistency only of Wroclaw, Gdansk or Olsztyn to visitors from Germany, now the old German names Breslau, Danzig, Alleinstein easily pass their lips. Likewise the formerly banned and taboo German city names appear on the advertising brochures of the cities.

Especially in Silesia more and more Polish local politicians are losing their fears of contacts with the organizations of the German expellees. In the end they hope for advantages for their communities. Already in the underground press of the 1980's, opposition intellectuals had repeatedly expressed understanding for the associations of refugees and expellees. In a democratic society their existence is normal, the well-known journalist Konstantij Gebert, then writing under the pseudonym Dawid Warszawski, stated. For many of those in the opposition it was greatly evident that the BdV (League of the Expellees) was built up as a bugbear constantly to justify the alliance with Moscow. Only the Soviet army can guarantee Poland's western border.

Moreover, similar "nostalgia clubs" have been established in Poland, such as the friends of Vilnius, or the Olsztyn Association in Wroclaw. After the war above all Poles from Lvov, the multinationality city, came to Wroclaw—after 99 percent of the original inhabitants had been expelled from Wroclaw. Professors of Lvov University who had survived the Soviet and German occupation in the war resumed lecturing after the war. Parts of the renowned Ossolineum Library were housed in the abandoned building of the renowned Matthias Secondary school at the Odra River. The Lvov Cabaret founded two years ago is one of the most popular theater groups in Wroclaw. Likewise pictures of the Gothic baroque cathedral of eastern Galicia's metropolis are hanging in many living rooms of Wroclaw's Polish citizens, as well as pictures of the Gothic city hall of the Lower Silesian capital, which remind Wroclaw's Germans of their homeland. Bookstores with good assortments also offer the volumes of the "Lemberger Bibliothek" (Lvov Library), also reprints of city maps or picture postcards from the time between the wars.

But many children and grandchildren of the repatriates are interested much less in the homeland of their ancestors in former Eastern Poland than in the German past of their towns and villages in Silesia, Pomerania, and East Prussia, which had lasted for centuries. For these young people reprints of old maps and German-language volumes of pictures represent a sought-after present. These articles are offered by publishing houses connected with the League of Expellees of all organizations.

In the latest conflict concerning the rights of the Polish minority in Lithuania, representatives of the German minority see parallels to their role in Poland during the rule of the Communist Party. But they do see an essential difference: While the German minority was left on its own, all Warsaw newspapers reported on their front pages on the disbanding of the Polish regional councils in Lithuania.

The Lithuanians blame the Poles to this day for the fact that Marshal Jozef Pilsudski in 1920 simply had their capital occupied and two years later incorporated the territory around Vilnius into Poland. The Ukrainians direct the same charges at Warsaw. In 1920 the Polish leadership is said to have taken advantage of the weakness of its neighbors to the east and moved its state border far beyond the settlement areas of its compatriots deep into the Ukraine. In Poland the discussion on the foreign policy after the World War I has not yet started, just as the Polonization of the territories gained at that time is being subjected to critical analysis only in isolated cases and with hesitation.

Disappointed by the Pope

Despite all discussions, the publications on the expulsion of the Germans from Poland also remain remarkable isolated cases for the time being. The new textbooks, too, use the formulation of the "territories recovered" after World War II, meant are Pomerania, Silesia, and East Prussia. The young generation of historians indeed has long abandoned the concept of the "return of the original Polish territories." But the Catholic Church continues to cling to this distorted concept of history. When Pope John Paul II visited Poland in June, he met with representatives of the Lithuanian, Byelorussian, and Ukrainian minority in Poland, but not with the Germans even though he had the opportunity to do so in Olsztyn where the DFK has over 5,000 members. The pope did not mention the German past of the city with a single word—to the great disappointment of the predominantly also Catholic German ethnic group in Poland.

In Wroclaw eight years ago he had spoken of the "great Polish tradition of the city." He did not mention that the city for over six centuries had belonged to the German culture area. An ethnic German priest in Upper Silesia said about the latest visit of the pope: "The Holy Father missed a great opportunity to contribute something to historical truth."

Commentary on Nature of Defense Structure

92EP0036A Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish
23 Sep 91 p 4

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel Jan Grudniewski: "My Opinion: Strategic Deterrence"]

[Text] A prerequisite for the development of the right plan for reforming the military is a vision of future armed conflict, of the means of national defense, and of the role of the armed forces in the accomplishment of

that defense which is the outgrowth of this approach. An appropriate military doctrine, from which ensue all the complex responsibilities of state organs and of citizens, is the fundamental prerequisite for the accomplishment of transformations in the army and in the country's system of defense.

Military doctrine in the Polish People's Republic hitherto anticipated that the Polish Army would act as one of the armies of the Soviet Union for offensive operations toward Western states. Polish territory was prepared for the massed transit of Soviet troops, and the Polish economy had the duty to safeguard this operation.

The defense doctrine introduced two years ago retreated from total aggression on the West, but did not change much in the matter of transforming the military, with the exception of a harmful disarmament of troop units on the "eastern wall" and the squandering of the military potential located there. Now, as the Warsaw Pact disintegrates, and entry into Western military alliances is not a possibility, we must discover our own system of national defense. Entry into NATO is not possible due to the fear of the influx of Soviet special forces, of which the Polish Army has not yet been cleansed. In the infiltration of the Western defense system, we could play the role of a Trojan horse.

Our own system must provide firmly for the basic plane of national security. Higher planes of security are assured by a skilful foreign policy and a wise set of alliances. To sum up, one may state with conviction that a deeper transformation of military structures, without a clear conception of military doctrine, is only a simulation of reformist action, and a wandering astray. As a result, the Ministry of National Defense's human potential and meager funds, and the presently favorable geopolitical situation, are squandered.

The Presupposition of Threats

Poland may expect genuine threats to its independence only from two of its neighbors: from Germany, and from the Soviet Union, or from the states arising from the Soviet Union's disintegration.

The worst scenario, yet also the most realistic, having been proven four times already, is the partition of Poland by its neighbors. The Polish state has the right and the duty to be prepared for such a worst-case version of events. Military personnel in particular have the duty to prepare for such a scenario. Providing for the worst scenario will assure the preparation of the state for more favorable scenarios.

Poland cannot permit itself to be submissive or act as a satellite toward its neighbors since, as historical experience shows, occupiers have always striven for the biological extermination of the Polish nation. This is the result of our neighbors' deeply rooted conviction of their right to Polish lands, and of the fact that Polish national characteristics like the tendencies toward individualism,

and group disobedience toward an occupier, lead eventually to ideas for the biological destruction of the nation. There is, therefore, no alternative but the absolute sovereignty and independence of Poland

The Search for Effective Models

A calculation of the might of Polish armed forces in comparison with the military abilities of Germany and the Soviet Union shows that we have no possibility of effective defense in direct armed conflict with these neighbors, whether together or separately. Such a conflict must end with occupation, and the effects resultant from occupation, and attempts at biological destruction.

It is necessary to take into consideration presuppositions of the outbreak of war, despite the fact that Europe is heading towards peace, since one must come to terms with one historical truth: namely that every once in a while societies behave irrationally, and that one may thus expect the worst outcomes. The present proposals of the Ministry of National Defense's leadership, and of some political forces, include the aim toward a professional army of over 200 thousand. Such an army would not guarantee sovereignty anyway, and would burden the state economically, and thus would not fulfill the basic aim of its creation; therefore it makes no sense to head in this direction.

Informal reform movements in the military, feeling a moral responsibility toward the security of the fatherland, propose a resolution of this difficult question through a change in the conception of military doctrine, from costly deterrence of the opponent with offensive might, to deterrence of the opponent by excessively high costs of occupying Poland.

The Doctrine of Total Defense

The realization of this model is based on such preparation of the Polish state in time of peace so that in time of war with a stronger opponent, it would be a well organized underground state, difficult to occupy and not allowing itself to be destroyed biologically. The unprofitability of occupation must become the agent of deterrence of a prospective stronger opponent from initiating a war. The truth of such a presupposition is confirmed by examples from modern history, in which small states defended themselves before aggression of powerful states through decisiveness and ability to defend oneself; for example, Switzerland defended itself before German aggression, and Yugoslavia and Romania, before Soviet aggression. The prospect of a drawn out partisan war disinclined a powerful aggressor.

The proposed model also takes into account the peacetime needs of a nation of almost forty million, as well as peacetime preparation for war.

It is based on three military elements:

I. An active, fully developed army of around 100,000, in accordance with the demands of rapid activation forces.

II. Territorial forces, mobilized regionally, representing in wartime the basis of the underground state.

III. A network of Alarm and Defense Stations (PAO), mobilized at their places of residence and keeping arms and supplies there.

The task of the active army is to fulfill the role of rapid activation forces in local conflicts and border battles. They will take part in supranational forces and in group security.

This army, because of its rather small size, could be outfitted with modern armaments within present financial constraints, and not differ from the present world standard. At present, the main force should consist of combat helicopters and well trained maneuver divisions, able to move to any region of Poland in the course of a few hours to contain incidents of limited scope. This army should be technically protected against destruction in the enemy's first blow. It should aid fighting operations, and ensure the government's departure abroad to maintain the continuity of the state. An active army is a volunteer, highly professional army. Due to the great demands on personnel, cadres in middle age would leave their posts for training centers and military offices providing for the whole of national defense.

Territorial forces, called up through mobilization, have the task of delaying the enemy's occupation of territory; after their defense is broken, they change over to partisan warfare, prepared beforehand, and to the underground state. These are not maneuvering forces, but rather tied to a geographic region. They are equipped with highly portable, light arms, and transportable antitank and anti-aircraft weapons. They consist of reserve soldiers, trained from three to six months in active service, according to their future assignment. This service is based on training in partisan warfare, sabotage, terrorism, and lifesaving.

These troops are the state's basic military element, and are the fundamental force in the total defense doctrine.

The network of Alarm and Defense Stations is a ring situated at a depth of 100 kilometers from the border, consisting of a chain of previously identified defense points along the enemy's predicted transit routes. Their task is to delay the rapid transit of troops, using active defense and combat engineering tactics. These stations are part of a centrally organized network of warning, alarm, and collection of information about the opponent. The stations are an element quickly mobilized by means of radio or other means of communication. They are based on resistance points which are appropriately chosen in the proximity of crews' places of residence, so that they can be manned by their crew within two hours. The crews' arms and supplies could be stored in places of residence until needed, with heavier equipment at the community or neighborhood level. Personnel would consist of well trained people, not exceeding a certain age limit, since they would change over to diversion and the armed underground in occupied territory. In peacetime,

the Alarm and Defense Stations should be closely linked with local government, so that they could be implemented in extraordinary internal matters, whether criminal or terrorist, until specialized divisions take over. In peacetime, the network of Alarm and Defense Stations in the border area and around urban areas of strategic importance is linked for training purposes with diversion and reconnaissance troops of the active army. From the moment of outbreak of war, the network is directly subordinated to these troops in terms of command, collection of information, and outfitting. The diversion and reconnaissance troops immediately become a well organized armed underground.

Adoption of a military doctrine which effectively assures a basic level of national security makes independent erection of a Polish policy possible, from the point of view of Poland's own interests. And this would be a policy worthy of a country of nearly 40 million. It would not be a threat to its neighbors, and would compel the state toward good and efficient organization, and compel the authorities to treat society as a partner. Looked at in terms of costs of troop upkeep, this model is based on a low-level military budget, since the transformation of the army into "territorial forces" relies upon present stores. The necessity of rebuilding armaments into portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons will give the already functioning arms industry the chance to utilize its experience and productive capacity. The costly organization of an active army can also rely upon domestic industry, since we have capacity and experience in this area (helicopters produced in Swidnik).

This model compels a different approach to military cadres, makes the excessive number of generals and colonels in active service superfluous, and forces a tough selection, in accordance with the positive criteria of cadre selection. The defense of Poland would not be a matter of momentarily favorable circumstances, since it would prepare us for the worst scenario of political evens.

This doctrine would not be in conflict with the idea of working toward continental integration, since it sets none of our neighbors in the category of enemies, and only aims at each attacker. It is consistent with the Polish psyche, and with Polish national characteristics. (Opinions presented in the series "My Opinion" are not always in agreement with the views of the editors; the author's style is maintained.)

Alternate Privatization Plan Said To Be Ignored

92EP0038A Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish
4 Oct 91 p 10

[Article by Danuta Zagrodzka: "Before Everything Turns to Scrap"]

[Text] A certain privatization concept has been in circulation in Poland since the spring, and it has been unable to get through. It appears to be cheaper and more effective than the program proposed officially. However,

it has fallen victim to animosity between ministries, and this is equivalent to a death sentence, writes Danuta Zagrodzka.

The concept of privatization "through nonmonetary credit" was unveiled publicly for the first time in May at a meeting of the Economic Council of the Council of Ministers, and subsequently at an economic conference in Belweder. Walery Amiel, until recently a member of the board of the World Bank, was the author. Among others, Amiel familiarized Janusz Lewandowski with the plan. As Amiel found, Lewandowski appeared to be interested. The Ministry of Ownership Transformation was even supposed to include this concept in its program as one of the possible paths of privatization, but it did not.

A considerable simplification of the privatization process and its maximum de-bureaucratization are the advantages of this idea. In Amiel's opinion, the draft solves two problems which are the greatest problems with privatization—the appraisal of assets and a lack of capital. The author proceeds from the assumption that under Polish conditions all appraisals do not make sense. He gives the example of the Gdansk Shipyard which some experts appraised at \$200 million and others at \$5 million!

Bids Plus an Auction Equal an Appraisal

In the West, the market makes an appraisal through bidding or auctions—the assets cost as much as they may be sold for. In Poland, the market value of state enterprises is completely indefinite. In the course of bidding with so many unknowns, possible buyers are afraid to offer, for example, a billion zlotys for a facility because they know that other offers may not exceed 100 million. As a result, assets are sold cheaply at auctions, at an obvious loss to the state.

The Amiel draft combines bidding with auctions. In normal bidding, the highest offer is usually the end; in this case, it is merely the beginning. After the results of the first round of bidding are announced, prospective buyers are given two more weeks in order to top the highest offer. In the process, it is envisaged that it cannot be topped by a margin smaller than a previously set percentage of the highest offer made (for example, 10 percent). This arrangement should result in proper prices verified by the market. The above notwithstanding, the State Treasury may reject a price which appears to it to be suspiciously lower.

Ten Percent Plus Installments

Each participant in bidding pays a security deposit in the amount of 10 percent of the price offered. It is returned to those who lose; the State Treasury retains the security deposit of the winner as a nonreturnable deposit. Therefore, a factory, or rather the right of ownership to it, is

purchased at 10 percent of the bidding price. The purchaser pays the rest in subsequent years; the size of repayment is pegged to the rate of inflation and, therefore, revalorized.

A mortgage lien is put on the deed which provides collateral for the State Treasury. If a debtor does not pay the State Treasury reclaims ownership and accepts another round of bids.

Those who pay cash on top of the required security deposit receive a two-point discount for each additional 10 percent of the bidding price. In this case, the state immediately receives more money, and in return it reduces the price somewhat. Domestic customers are given a handicap: To beat out a domestic customer, a foreign investor has to top his offer by 15 percent, and if ownership is to be mixed (a joint venture)—by 7.5 percent.

Anybody can submit bids—Poles, foreigners, and employees, singly or in groups. All state enterprises may be up for bids on the condition that their work forces and parent agencies agree.

Owner Rather Than Official

In the opinion of the author of the draft, authorizing this mode of privatization would not only speed it up considerably but will also ensure the most appropriate selection, which will certainly be better than that done by even a team of the most expert officials. Anybody who knows that he is capable of operating an enterprise may become an owner provided that he risks his own money. Due to the fact that he pays relatively little up front, he can invest the funds he owns into the company and its development. The burden of the responsibility for curing, restructuring, or commercializing state property is lifted from the shoulders of the state and its officials. This is supposed to be the concern of owners for now.

Councils of trustees which are appointed by the president, and are naturally politicized, are not necessary. The owner is clearly defined; he is the manager. The size of the labor force is to be agreed upon before submitting bids in order to avoid conflicts with employees. Those who are let go may receive compensations. So-called self-ranking is also envisaged: The labor force itself decides who should be laid off.

The method is cheap. It does not call for tremendous outlays for appraisals and a large bureaucratic apparatus. At the same time, it provides continuous revenue for the State Treasury, though not too high in the beginning. Likewise, it does not require special banking services, apart from accepting security deposits and payments on behalf of the State Treasury for a fee. As is known, so far privatization has for the most part cost money whereas the revenue of the budget has been next to none.

The Ministry Has Doubts

In July, RZECZPOSPOLITA published in its entirety the draft which was discussed above in brief, together with a position of the Ministry of the Ownership Transformation expressed by head of the ministerial advisor team Jerzy Gajdka. He criticized the draft for the lack of a review of the enterprise before accepting bids. He was of the opinion that such privatization cannot be practiced in the environment of high rates of inflation and "uncertainty as to the market of enterprises." He voiced apprehensions as to the ability to collect the amounts due. In his opinion, such a small proprietary input does not guarantee the security of the assets which may cause losses at many enterprises. He also stated that the draft is not new. Similar arrangements were used in, among other places, Chile, and they resulted in many dangers and even bankruptcies. As far as Poland is concerned, leasing is such a form to a degree.

However, the conclusion was quite mild: The principle is reasonable, but it can only be used to a limited extent. The ratio between the capital invested upfront and the payments should be different; the first payment (security deposits) should amount to 40 percent rather than 10 percent.

For his part, the expert Professor Janusz Goscinski stated (also in RZECZPOSPOLITA) that the proposal has more merits than flaws. First of all, it contains none of the bureaucratic features characteristic of the program of universal privatization. As head of a consulting company, he would recommend this plan to his clients with certain amendments. However, he thought that this type of privatization was feasible only for medium-size and small enterprises. Large enterprise should still be privatized by the capital method.

The Author Defends Himself

Walery Amiel responded to accusations: Of course, bankruptcies are possible under any arrangement; they are a feature of capitalism. He stated that in his proposal, the property of the state is protected by encumbered mortgages. The possibility of assets being plundered under this method is certainly smaller than at present, when nothing is done and enterprises are actually threatened with demise due to torpor. Besides, we cannot assume from the very beginning that plundering will occur. The arrangement is voluntary and open. Anybody who wants to submit bids. Therefore, exposing enterprises is out of the question.

If we are going to delay privatization, some time later 40 percent of the payment may turn out to be less than 10 percent at present because enterprises will be worth less and less. Finding genuine rather than official owners for enterprises may save them. Let us not be concerned about whether or not these owners will cope. It is their money and their responsibility.

Foreign capital will also step in with greater eagerness if an owner rather than a bureaucrat is its partner. The

situation is critical, and it calls for very prompt actions. The method in question makes such actions possible: No central offices are required, and a call for bids may be issued by, for example, the voivode.

A Tactical Error

It is debatable whether Amiel is right or not. It is beyond a doubt that he was out of luck. The Ministry of Ownership Transformation was preoccupied primarily with its own complex program of comprehensive privatization. Having failed to receive a response, the author presented his project to the minister of industry. This turned out to be a tactical error. By the end of his tenure, Minister Zawislak, helpless in the face of collapsing enterprises, grabbed at this project like a drowning man at a straw. He presented it as an original program of his department competing with other programs, which the Ministry of Ownership Transformation could not but dislike. He resigned shortly thereafter.

Any adult person would know that there are no ideal solutions which are the only correct ones. Noncapital privatization, as the Amiel proposal was called somewhat inaccurately, certainly has shortcomings that have not been discovered, but then all methods do.

Personally, I am not convinced that Poland has that many enterprising people, who are inclined to shoulder the burden of troubles of former state factories, especially now, during the recession. To be sure, these factories can be had relatively cheaply, but not free of charge after all. So, what next?

Walery Amiel maintains that 20 members of the Guild of Polish Entrepreneurs, the association of our biggest capitalists, enumerated just like that, off the cuff, 100 factories which they would be inclined to purchase. They liked the method very much. I have personally heard complaints on many occasions that our domestic capital is not allowed to participate in privatization. However, will there be as many prospective buyers when the time comes to put the cash on the barrel?

In turn, with the number of competitors being small, we may have apprehensions concerning a collusion of the interested parties aimed at buying the company as cheaply as possible.

There also is a psychological barrier. Dispersed shares and an anonymous bureaucratic owner are easier to stomach in our country than a capitalist of flesh and blood, a domestic one to boot. God forbid, he might be nomenklatura; at present, they eagerly pin this label on anyone who has money.

Therefore, would this be a fair privatization? The author of the proposals retorts that there is nothing to prevent the employees themselves from collecting the amount necessary to pay the security deposit and become owners. Besides, is it fair for a factory to collapse? Is there any choice at all?

The privatization concept in question is basically the closest to a thesis voiced in the spring on the pages of *GAZETA WYBORCZA* by Ernest Skalski, to the effect that "it is better to sell state assets at scrap prices than let them finish rusting in our hands," except that Amiel attempts to secure the best possible price for this "scrap" for the State Treasury. All reservations notwithstanding, this is a simple and sensible method. The reasons why it should not at the very least be tested are unknown.

In a typical Polish manner, the Walery Amiel privatization project was a casualty of the overlapping responsibilities of two ministries.

I am trying to revive it because I believe that it is worthwhile.

[Box, p 10]

In recent months, the department of Minister Lewandowski released its own concepts of speeding up owner-ship transformation.

So-called universal privatization with the participation of several hundred large and medium-sized enterprises is the first of such concepts (it is unknown whether there will be 400 such enterprises, as originally planned). Sixty percent of the shares of the enterprises are to end up free of charge in the hands of all adult citizens of our country through so-called National Assets Boards. This system makes it possible to obviate the appraisal of privatized enterprises.

Another idea is to sell small companies through bidding in an accelerated manner: The winner will have to pay "upfront" at least 40 percent of the cost of the enterprise purchased.

So far, both concepts have not resulted in the expected success of their authors. Universal privatization has been quite universally criticized (including on the pages of *GAZETA WYBORCZA*), and the interest of Polish investors in purchasing small companies is not great.

The Economic Council of the Council of Ministers is expected to discuss privatization at its meeting on Saturday.

Sugar Beet Production for Year Detailed

92EP0018B Warsaw *RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY AND LAW supplement)* in Polish 18 Sep 91 p 1

[Article by Edmund Szot: "Sugar Prospects"]

[Text] Following last year's overproduction of sugar, whose export required a large degree of additional financing, this year's sugar campaign looks much more economical. The sugar beet growing area comes to 350,000 hectares, i.e., 90,000 hectares fewer than last year.

These figures are reported by the chairman of the Sugar Industry Council, Jerzy Kruszynski, who is director of

the sugar mill in Strzelin (Wroclaw Voivodship). These figures differ considerably from the estimates of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry, as well as from the GUS [Central Office of Statistics], which predicts a drop in the cultivated surface area by 40,000 hectares. Yields are also expected to be lower than last year—at a level of 355 quintals per hectare (last year—380 quintals per hectare). Only the sugar content in the roots is similar to that of last year.

Two factors have decided about the reduction in the surface area under beet cultivation: a drop in production profitability and further reduction in cow livestock.

As a result, this year's sugar production will reach—as is projected—a level of 1,400,000 tons, i.e., it will be 600,000 tons lower than a year ago. At the end of August, supplies of sugar in the sugar mill warehouse came to 228,000 tons; at the end of September, they will come to approximately 60,000 tons. However, at that time many sugar mills will already be in operation of which as one of the first, the sugar mill in Brzesc Kujawski (Wloclawek Voivodship) will begin the processing of beets on or about 20 September.

From a technical standpoint, the sugar mills are pretty well prepared for the campaign despite the fact that because of the difficult economic situation they have limited their investments and repairs. The situation is worse when it comes to supplies of bulk commodities (limestone, coal) whose purchase is being delayed to this day (due to financial difficulties).

Purchase prices for sugar beets have not as yet been set. Presently, regional negotiations are being conducted with farmers' trade unions. The span of proposals from both sides is within a range of 180,000 to 230,000 zlotys [Z] per ton. The majority of sugar mills have abandoned the old method of establishing beet prices based on wheat prices (20 percent). Currently, they are determined on the basis of the price of sugar. This means that the price of one quintal of beets equals the price of 4.5 to 5 kg of sugar. On the other hand, the sale price of sugar will depend in turn on whether the sugar mills will receive preferential credit for the purchase of sugar beets. The need for such credit is estimated at Z3 billion.

In sum, this will be one of the shortest campaigns of the sugar industry following the war. It will last—as is projected—an average of 77 days, although there are sugar mills that will not have enough raw material for even 40 days.

Six sugar mills (out of a total of 78) have made the decision to privatize. During the privatization process, shares for growers, among others, are foreseen. They will, then, better understand the situation of the sugar industry and will not make the possible decision to blockade sugar mills. Director Kruszynski fully supports this idea but assures that growers already now understand the senselessness of such protests. On the other hand, he would wish for his own benefit (and for ours) that following privatization, Polish sugar mills will

remain in Polish hands. The Polish sugar industry has the oldest tradition. It is on our soil that the world's first processing of sugar beets into sugar began.

POLITYKA Weekly News Roundup: 29 Sep-5 Oct

92EP0042A Warsaw *POLITYKA* in Polish No 40,
5 Oct 91 p 2

[Excerpts]

National News

The Sejm adopted a retirement law. The version proposed by the Sejm commission, which based its work on the government proposal, was adopted. It is somewhat less favorable to retirees and includes a more significant reduction at higher levels of benefits. There were 157 votes for, 55 against, and 117 abstentions. [passage omitted]

ZYCIE WARSZAWY has printed its grades for the television election campaign. It is using two criteria: the attractiveness of the speeches and the substantive contents of the comments. After the first round of television presentations, the Liberal-Democratic Congress (KLD) received the highest overall grade (nine points on a scale of zero to 12). Then came: NSZZ Solidarity, the Alliance of the Democratic Left (SLD), Labor Solidarity (SP), and the Citizens' Center Accord (POC).

KURIER POLSKI conducted a similar survey but among 100 individuals in the telephone book. In the television election programs, the Democratic Union (UD) has come off best (27 percent), then the Union for Real Politics (UPR) (21 percent), and the Liberal-Democratic Congress (KLD) (15 percent). They also evaluated the television journalists who asked the questions. Tadeusz Jacewicz (40 percent) was rated first, and Jacek Kurski (1 percent) came in last.

The Social Research Institute in Sopot asked a representative sample of the residents of Gdansk Voivodship, who would be the best premier in a new, post-election government. The most frequently mentioned person was J.K. Bielecki (27 percent); second was T. Mazowiecki (12 percent). Other mentioned (by less than 10 percent of the respondents) were K. Skubiszewski, L. Balcerowicz, Jacek Kuron, B. Geremek, and W. Cimoszewicz. The following completed the list: L. Moczulski, S. Tyminski, J. Kaczynski, and M. Krzaklewski.

At a press conference, Jacek Kuron said: "We had a chance over the course of three years to create a comprehensive system for the development of housing construction—financing, loans, and use of apartments. Meanwhile, two years have already been wasted. The entire affair is a scandal." In December 1989, the French offered us help which could have ensured a rental apartment for 90 percent of those waiting in line. Kuron accused the former minister Aleksander Paszynski and "even more" the current minister Adam Glapinski of not

doing anything in this respect: "The entire affair is a 'classic abandonment' caused by fear of taking responsibility upon oneself." Minister Glapinski protested Kuron's argument. The report of the French offer is false. [passage omitted]

The Warsaw Voivodship Office asked the court to dissolve the Polish Olympic Committee, to suspend the board, and to name a trustee. An audit done in July by the office showed that the charter of the Polish Olympic Committee conflicts in several important points with the law on associations. After a few hours, PAP transmitted a declaration by Aleksander Kwasniewski, president of the Polish Olympic Committee (Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland [SDRP]), who as TRYBUNA reports "point for point, precisely and without emotion showed that the accusations are without foundation, unless one is looking for a master key into completely different activities, into the political and repressive background."

Lech Walesa had a telephone conversation with Marek Siwicz, the editor in chief of TRYBUNA. The presidential press office reports that TRYBUNA printed "false information, concerning the supposed connections of the president's sons with the partnership El-Gaz. The president emphasized that during his term in office neither he nor any of the members of his family will be a partner in any partnership."

The priests of the Community of the Resurrection have opened a school for Catholic leaders. It is to train students in three specialties: community leaders, formation leaders, and economic and political leaders. It is to create a new Catholic elite. The school is "to rebuild the vitality of Christian culture by demasking the atheistic influences damaging Catholic culture."

A survey of voters by Lobo, a new opinion survey center, which is chiefly interested in the rural areas and small towns, shows that only 38 percent of the respondents is prepared to participate in the elections; 62 percent is undecided. Among those who intend to vote, the largest number support the candidacies of M. Kozakiewicz (Sejm marshal), J. Sosko (chairman of the Sejm Agricultural Commission (a Polish Peasant Party [PSL] activist), J. Kuron, S. Tyminski, W. Pawlak (farmer, Polish Peasant Party leader), W. Cimoszewicz, A. Michnik, and G. Janowski.

RZECZPOSPOLITA has calculated which office pays the most. The highest average, including bonuses, goes to the President's Chancellery—3.0478 million zlotys [Z]; the lowest to the Ministry of Health and Social Services—Z1.8955 million. The average wage increased the most over the course of a year in the Ministry of Finance, by 185.5 percent and the President's Chancellery, by 185.2 percent. In the eight voivodship offices studied, the average monthly wage in May 1991 was Z2.0396 million, including bonuses. Over the course of the year from May 1990, these wages increased an average of 2.5-fold.

During a Mass for the fatherland, which preceded an election meeting of the Catholic Election Action with Prof. Wieslaw Chrzanowski, president of the Christian National Union (ZChN) and minister of justice, Bishop Jozef Michalik, bishop ordinary of Gorzow, said: "I have repeatedly said and will continue to say: a Catholic is obliged to vote for a Catholic, a Christian for a Christian, a Muslim for a Muslim, a Jew for a Jew, a Mason for a Mason, every Communist for a Communist. Let each of them vote for the one his conscience suggests. But one must tell oneself openly that this field cannot be left alone." [passage omitted]

The Association of Journalists of the Republic of Poland met. The organization includes 8,680 journalists, the vast majority of those in the occupation in Poland today. Marian Podkowinski was again elected president. The assembly supported the formation of a trade union for journalists. As is generally known, Maciej Ilowiecki, the president of the Association of Polish Journalists, mentioned this idea earlier, but it aroused a protest by groups of journalists in the Association of Polish Journalists, including, among others, Wanda Falkowska, Hanna Krall, and Krzysztof Czabanski, who reject any agreement between the journalist organizations. [passage omitted]

At a press conference in Lodz conducted by Bishop Adam Lepa, the chairman of the Episcopate Commission on the Socialized Mass Media, the activity of the Lodz church was discussed. Among the issues discussed were the possibility of forming Christian trade unions, a Catholic Association of Journalists, a diocese paper, and a Catholic press agency. In the near future, a diocese radio station will be set up. [passage omitted]

Opinions

Maciej Jankowski, head of the Mazowsze Region of NSZZ Solidarity:

(Interviewed by Barbara Sidorczuk, GAZETA WSPOLNA 1 September)

[Sidorczuk] It is said that the Mazowsze Region remains in opposition to the National commission.

[Jankowski] Mazowsze simply has its own program, but it is not striving for separation. Little steps are not effective, and the situation demands a clear answer to the question: which order, which system?

[Sidorczuk] Precisely, which one?

[Jankowski] We support a free-market economy with guaranteed rights for the workers and social services for the weakest. As was the case in many countries in Western Europe after the war. Rampant capitalism, as it is developing in Poland now, is a total mistake, which threatens not only the average person, but also the state.

Jerzy Turowicz, editor in chief of TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY, on the letter of the Episcopate on the Day of the Socialized Mass Media:

(TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY 22 September)

"The bishops are proposing that the mass media serve the work of a new mission. And again precise formulations are lacking. The Catholic press certainly should serve a new mission, but it is probably improper to demand that of the entire press or of other mass medias. Only Catholics are called to responsibility for spreading the Good News."

Prof. Aleksander Krawczuk, a candidate for deputy of the Alliance of the Democratic Left (SLD) in Krakow:

(Interviewed by Dariusz Lanocha, TRYBUNA 23-28 September)

[Lanocha] Why did you decide to seek a seat on the left side of the aisle?

[Krawczuk] There are several reasons, and I will list the most important ones. First: my political ambitions were born of esteem for the president. Lech Walesa and his political wisdom and farsightedness. He is the one who aroused me to more concrete action by saying that in order to maintain the necessary balance in Poland, the left, and not just the right, leg is needed.

Meanwhile, I have observed with concern that our society is again being indoctrinated, only now it is exclusively a rightist ideology. Rightist dogmatism has obviously gained its voice, and its remedy for all society's ills is privatization by force of everyone and everything without regard for the social costs or consequences of this operation. We experienced such an uncontrolled passion at the beginning of the 1950's, only then it was called nationalization.

The domination of one ideology not accepted by everyone will not put us on the path of democracy. In order for there to be a true right, there must be a left, if only for balance and mutual control. The left is now weaker, but I have decided to support it with my candidacy since helping the weaker is a generous thing and was always part of my nature.

General Kadijevic Discusses Army Goals

92BA0060C Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian
5-6 Oct 91 p 4

["Text" of declaration by Army General Veljko Kadijevic, federal secretary for national defense: "What Is Going on in Croatia Is Neo-Nazism"]

[Text] From the very beginning of the crisis in our country, the Yugoslav People's Army [JNA] has been trying to create the conditions for its peaceful and democratic outcome on the basis of the Constitution and federal laws, through the institutions of the system. We have been persistent and patient in advocating this, right up to this very day. Nevertheless, events have taken quite a difference course, primarily because of the operation of destructive internal forces, but also because of the essential influence of certain foreign factors which are deeply involved in everything that has been happening in our country.

I believe that there is no army in the world which has at any time in history been in a more unenviable position than ours. We have been left without a state, and from what was to be seen and heard last night from the March meeting of the Supreme Command, you have seen once again, in an obvious way, what kind of supreme commander we have. Certain members of the SFRY Presidency have deliberately frustrated the adoption of decisions with the clear objective of breaking up Yugoslavia by hampering and breaking up the Army. The federal prime minister, with his perfidious tricks, has joined them. The world is not aware of this attitude of the supreme commander and prime minister toward their own army.

The deep interethnic divisions which have affected Yugoslav society could not have bypassed the Yugoslav People's Army. It is only thanks to the choice of generally acceptable objectives for the Army's commitment that for a long time we were able to avoid the internal upheavals. As the interethnic confrontations became more acute, those with a nationalistic commitment, chameleons, petty politicians, and cowards have more and more dropped out of the ranks of the Army.

In one part of the country they are accusing us of being occupiers. The fascist regime in Croatia says that we have occupied one-third of the territory of that republic on behalf of Serbia, and individuals and groups in other regions, blinded by nationalism and a thirst for power at any price, are proclaiming us to be traitors.

This is not happening by accident. From the so-called mothers' movement, including prevention of the mobilization of certain units, to the flagrant falsehoods about the unity of the Army leadership, everything has been prepared in the same kitchen and is aimed at destroying the Yugoslav People's Army. They know that they can win the war which they have imposed on us only if they destroy the Army from within.

But what has the Yugoslav People's Army actually wanted, and what has it actually done?

Acting under the decision of the SFRY Presidency, our exclusive goal—by committing our main forces in the crisis areas—was to prevent bloody interethnic conflicts and prevent a repetition of genocide against the Serbian people. We sent into those areas a portion of the forces from other garrisons in Croatia and from other parts of the country, which the Ustasha authorities there used for a general blockade of garrisons in other parts of the republic that lasted several days. Some of them were taken by force using measures which have all the features of a genocidal inclination.

What is going on in the Republic of Croatia is neo-Nazism. At this moment, it is the greatest threat to the Serbian people in Croatia, but neo-Nazism is in direct opposition to the vital interests of the Croatian people and every other nationality in Yugoslav space.

At this point, the Army does not want anything except to reestablish control in the crisis areas, to protect the Serbian people from persecution and destruction, and to liberate members of the JNA and members of their families. Defeat of the Ustasha forces is a condition for that to be brought about. We stick staunchly to our position, which has been repeated several times, that all the political issues must be resolved in an agreement that honors the legitimate rights and interests of all our nationalities.

In seeking ways for a way out of the present crisis, we appreciate the well-intentioned assistance of the European Community and other international factors. However, we must warn that the commitment of any foreign military troops is absolutely unacceptable to us, regardless of whose troops they are.

The SFRY Presidency has established that an immediate danger of war does exist and has offered support to the measures and actions which the Yugoslav People's Army has been taking in this situation. This refutes in the most direct way the accusations which the principal wreckers of Yugoslavia have been launching against the Army and its leadership, accusing it of supposedly carrying out a military putsch.

Establishment of the existence of an immediate threat of war invokes the legal norms which under those conditions apply with respect to mobilization and other actions related to defense of the country. But in spite of that, I use this occasion to call upon patriots from the ranks of all the nationalities and ethnic minorities to discharge their obligations in defense against fascism and genocide in this region.

Data on Mixture of Ethnic Groups in Republics

92BA0046A Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian
30 Sep 91 p 11

[Article by Vojislava Vignjevic: "Ethnic Map of Yugoslavia: The Calamity of Internecine War"—first paragraph is BORBA introduction]

[Text] The largest number of mixed marriages in Croatia are found precisely in the crisis regions: 34.9 percent in Pakrac, 33.8 percent in Vukovar, 24.9 percent in Petrinja.... One out of three children in Osijek is from a mixed marriage.

The senseless, dirty war in Yugoslavia is taking many lives, destroying cities, and devastating human souls. Ties between neighbors are broken off, and people are judged exclusively as members of the nation—as loyalists or traitors. Neither families nor marriages, which have almost completely lost the attribute of privacy, have been spared the aggressive inroads made by the grand masters of war and the national standard-bearers. This is especially true in mixed areas, which is exactly where war is being waged most furiously.

At the most neuralgic points of the Yugoslav ethnic map, it is not possible to draw a clear line separating "us" and "them." Statistics from 1981 indicate that as many as 13.5 percent of all children come from mixed marriages. In Croatia, that figure is above 15 percent, and it is even much higher in opstinas experiencing the fiercest fighting. For example, in Pakrac it is 34.9 percent, in Vukovar 33.8 percent, in Petrinja 24.9 percent, and in Osijek 29.9 percent. Among other things, these and other figures gathered by Dr. Srdjan Bogosavljevic, the director of the Federal Institute of Statistics, show how, in his words, "in the Yugoslav conflict, one cannot speak of classical wartime objectives, but rather of the desire by national leaders to create ethnically homogeneous ministates." This was reasonable during the feudal age, but today, when borders are disappearing in Europe, this is at the very least disgraceful. Thus, everyone in the territory of Yugoslavia should be ashamed: the Serbs (who account for around 38 percent), the Croats (20 percent), the Slovenes (9 percent) the Muslims (10 percent), the Macedonians (6 percent), the Montenegrins (2.6 percent), the non-Slavic minority Albanians (8.5 percent), Hungarians (2 percent), etc.

Tragedy of Children

If one considers the mixing of Serbs with Croats, the largest areas are found along the three lines where the conflict is raging. The first comprises Benkovac, Obrovac, Gospic, Otocac, Ogulin, Vrbosko. Not all of this line has been caught up in the fighting yet; the strategically important point through which the only link between Zagreb and the coast passes—Vrbosko—has been spared. The second line is also ethnically intermixed: Vojnic, Vrgin Most, Glina, Kostajnica, Pakrac, Daruvar, Grubisno Polje, and Podravska Slatina. In all of these opstinas, the ratio of Serbs to Croats is 1 to 2 or the other

way around. Wherever one group or the other has a three- to fourfold advantage, there is no fighting in those opstinas. Finally, there is the third line—Vukovar and Osijek, the so-called Danubian front, in which there is not a great deal of intermixing, but the fighting is fierce because of the proximity of Serbia and the large number of Serbian villages. It is interesting that, for example, Osijek is a Croatian city, while Vukovar is a predominantly Serbian city. Beli Manastir has not been caught up in the fighting, because it is neutralized by the Hungarian majority.

Bogosavljevic warns that the most tragic thing is that the number of children from mixed marriages is terribly high precisely in these regions. This is not illogical, because they speak the same language and look the same. How could anyone who does not know people from Pakrac, for example, distinguish between Serbs and Croats in that city? Children from mixed marriages there account for between 20 and 35 percent. During the census 10 years ago, these were children, but now they have become soldiers. One out of every three children in Osijek comes from a mixed marriage, and they must now decide which side to fight on. In any event, whatever befalls them will be against their family. And these people will probably not be able to emerge from this war in a normal state.

Only Hostages Remain

Defenders of the idea that it is possible to create ethnically homogeneous territories by regrouping opstinas—people who have apparently never laid eyes on these hard statistical figures—will be left disappointed. Not even theoretical trials of different variants for drawing demarcation lines between nations based on the majority-nationality principle have yielded satisfactory results. However you regroup the opstinas, says Bogosavljevic, there remain between 900,000 and 1,600,000 people outside the territory of their own motherland-nation. These people in fact constitute the hostages that can be resettled, converted, or destroyed, and all of that leads only to war. And once again, the question arises concerning such people: Will they all know where they belong, will those who fluctuate ethnically be able to choose sides, or an even more terrible dilemma—how to avoid killing relatives on the opposing side?

Writing off those whom it is not even possible to resettle could be the result of a policy in which none of the leaders who are waging war have the vision and serious intention of creating a prosperous society. Because if at least one of them did, he would easily defeat his shortsighted and egotistical partners.

Bosnia is a special case, because the intermixing there is literally on the level of local communities. That republic has an above-average number of children from mixed marriages, 15.9 percent. Of the larger Yugoslav territories, only Vojvodina has a larger percentage of mixed marriages than Bosnia-Herzegovina. Ethnic mixing is greater between Muslims and Serbs than between Serbs

and Croats or Muslims and Croats. For example, Visegrad is 62.8 percent Muslim and 32.8 percent Serb. The city is of note because movement by the Army in this region has provoked fear. It is a reflection of present-day relations that the Serbs are uncertain because there are twice as many Muslims, while with the arrival of the Army the Muslims become uncertain because now there are four times as many Serbs. The whole business has to do with the fact that mistrust is being systematically built up, and conditions are being created for situations of excess to become the rule. But as Bogosavljevic notes, Bosnia is simply a mirror in which one can clearly see everything that is happening. When you break a mirror, they say, it means seven years of bad luck. But if Bosnia is broken up, it will bring a serious spell of bad luck for everyone in Yugoslavia.

Bewildered Europe

The world cannot help but be at least bewildered about this type of intermixing, because Yugoslavia is unique in this regard. In other countries, the borders between nations are clear, as are language barriers. The Serbs, Croats, and Muslims in Visegrad differ only in religion, because they speak the same language and have the same customs and cultural practices. Europe is aware of our ethnic mix, and that is why it is not that easy to take sides, because essentially what we need most here is peace. The solution is some sort of buffer zone, supervision over these mixed areas so that the situation can calm down over a period of 10 or so years.

Concluding this story about nations, Bogosavljevic recalls an American study on ethnic and genetic borders around the world. It is indicative that the study concluded that one of the most stable ethnic and genetic borders is between Slovenia and Italy, and that from there to Asia Minor there are practically no clear genetic borders. Moreover, both Sumadinkas and Croats could be "found" in Syria, for example. In this obviously genetically homogeneous region of ours, the number of victims is become a statistical measure of the intensity of ethnic friction and of the faith of the people in their national leaders. The circumstances of deaths and the identity of the victims have long since ceased to be front-page news and are increasingly recorded only in military or police reports.

[Box, p 11]

'Mixed' Slovenes

Not even in the most ethnically homogeneous Yugoslav republic do children constitute a nationally homogeneous contingent. Of the 701,267 children in Slovenia, 7.9 percent are from mixed marriages, while 19 percent are from monoethnic, non-Slovene marriages. "Pure" Slovene marriages account for 73.1 percent.

Views of Serbian Democratic Party Leaders Scored

92BA0060D Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian
5 Oct 91 p 8

[Article by Ivkica Bacic, Belgrade: "Farewell, Serbian Democrats"]

[Text] So, even the Democrats have finally removed the last mask behind which they have for months been selling to the gullible their supposed peacemaking and their supposed oppositionism to the bloody Milosevic-Seselj plan for the conquest of other people's territory. With the cynical remark that "the war objectives cannot be the conquest of Zagreb and Croatian villages, but those regions in Croatia where the Serbs live," which is nothing other than the napalm bomb wrapped in a "democratic" envelope which Milosevic's pet Seselj intended for Zagreb unless they quickly waved the white flag. Dr. Dragoljub Micunovic, leader of the Serbian Democrats, on Wednesday made a public call for the former Yugoarmy to take a firm stand on those "Serbian ethnic corridors."

When back this summer, Dr. Zoran Djindjic, one of the leaders of the Democratic Party, went to the speaker's rostrum of the Serbian Parliament with an unfurled war flag, because "anything else today would signify capitulation." There were naive people who at the time attributed his warmongering appeal to the "political amateurism" which Djindjic displays, at the same time defending the party for whom, it would seem, war is not in its political program. There was abundant whispering at the time in the political corridors about (yet another) split among the Democrats, whose leader, Micunovic, was traveling on official business, while Djindjic was singing that "the Serb is ready and willing to go off as a soldier." Today, no one is naive any longer, today it is crystal clear to everyone that even the Democrats, just like Vuk Draskovic, have intended a horrible destiny for all Serbs—the fate of an aggressor wanting to turn all the members of the former Yugoslva Federation into its protectorates.

Understanding and accepting war as Serbia's only political topic, and unable to oppose the Milosevic-Seselj argument of blood with an argument of bread, the main and strongest part of the Serbian opposition thereby removed once and for all the last dilemma over whether there are democratic forces in Serbia that could halt the warfare today under the symbols of the red star and the cockade.

Unifying those insignia, because, the Lord knows, it is time to take sides in the war alongside the Socialists and Chetniks, even the Democrats have thereby patted the Yugoslliedry on the back, encouraging it to continue with its atrocities, which have horrified the entire world. Vuk Draskovic long ago made a public promise to visit the battlefields where "all the Serbs on the earth and under the earth are being defended." Presumably, we

will not have to wait very long then for Serbian expansionists like Micunovic and Djindjic to issue the same shout of "After me, heroes!" At least in some respects they might in that way display their consistency, and even the lack of principle concerning nationality they have displayed up to now—in the opinion of the Socialists in power and the Chetniks who are close to them—would be forgotten. And Micunovic and Djindjic would at the same time find themselves in the right company: shoulder to shoulder with the tandems Kadijevic-Adzic and Milosevic-Seselj.

Popularity of Serbian Paramilitary Leaders

92BA0024B Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 20 Sep 91
pp 14-15

[Article by Uros Komlenovic: "People for These Times"—first paragraph is NIN introduction]

[Text] Until recently, "honest people" had the lowest possible opinion of many commanders of today's national guards. Now, however, many people are ready to put themselves under their command and embark upon the most dangerous road—to war.

It was only after the death of the commander of the Serbian Guard, Djordje Bozovic-Giska, who died in Gospic in a battle against units of the Croatian Ministry of Internal Affairs and National Guard Corps, that it became clear to many people that the war was slowly entering Belgrade as well. The departure of the last romantic hero of the Belgrade underground also called attention to a phenomenon that some people are welcoming and others are sharply criticizing: Former criminals are becoming the founders and commanders of armed units, recruiting and training people, fighting on the front, and dying (like Giska), and some of them, with the wholehearted assistance of the media, are creating myths out of themselves (like Captain Dragan, regarding whom the Australian press claims—and he does not deny it—that he was involved in illegal activities). If this can be explained by the fact that our "troubled" times are simply ideal for people with an adventurous spirit, until recently it was almost impossible to imagine the popularity that they have—many citizens have even voluntarily put themselves under the command of one of them, and thus entrusted their lives to them. There is no mystery at all about Branislav Lainovic-Dugi, the deputy commander of the Serbian Guard:

"In the world of crime, one pays a high price for any dishonor. That is why there are unwritten laws and codes of honor that criminals, especially those who enjoy authority, strictly respect. At the time of an erosion of morality, when widespread violation of the laws is occurring, it is natural for people to turn to us, former criminals who have repented their sins, because they know that we keep our word and that we will not betray their trust. When one goes to war, this criterion is very important. Furthermore, even while we were 'on the other side of the law,' and later, as businessmen, we

frequently displayed courage, intelligence, enterprise, and resourcefulness, as well as leadership ambitions; and those are characteristics that a potential soldier expects from his commander."

It is interesting that the director of the Institute for Criminological and Sociological Research, Dobrivoje Radovanovic, a psychologist by profession, agrees almost completely with Lainovic:

"The degree of aggression in people who have been convicts for many years is very high. That aggression is basic in nature, and it leads to hyperactivity in all fields. Such people usually become unofficial leaders in prison. Accustomed to lead, they will also be leaders later in life, whatever they do. Naturally, this applies to a small percentage of people, who are above-average in all their characteristics, who would probably have been successful in other fields as well, because they are smart, ambitious, and highly motivated for any job they accept. In addition to this, no matter how unusual it may appear at first glance, they have their own system of moral values. It encompasses several characteristics that are almost identical to those in the noncriminal part of society: courage, the sacredness of one's given word, perseverance, and the ability to endure difficulties. Almost 90 percent of their morality is in common with the generally accepted moral norms of society."

National Interest

Perhaps the reason for the intensive military and political activity of the former "angels with dirty faces" should be sought in the collapse of a political system, when its victims come to the forefront. Some of them occupy high positions in the new ruling structure, changed by multiparty elections (Tudjman, Izetbegovic, and Mesic). In Serbia, however, the old state and party structure, with some necessary changes, has weathered the first blow and remained in power, and in doing so, has made use of sufficiently aggressive individuals from among the people who are capable of moving the masses, inspiring them, and thus paving the way.

"With the outbreak of open armed conflicts in Krajina, Slavonia, and elsewhere, people with a 'public reputation' who have imposed themselves upon the public, have stood without reservation behind the political goals of their leaders," states Dr. Vladan Vasiljevic, a scientific adviser of the Institute for Criminology. "In power and around it, dubious values have multiplied in the form of 'protectors of national interests' (in Serbia, Kosutic, Crncevic, Sokolovic, and Bakocevic, and in Croatia, Djodan, Brezak, and Glavas), who have portrayed the opposing nation as devils, while resorting to the principle so close to totalitarianism that the end justifies the means. In Croatia the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community], in addition to the regular units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the National Guard Corps, resorted to arming its members, and later did not even scorn formation of the Black Legion, a unit with a very dubious nature. During that time, the SPS [Socialist

Party of Serbia] committed itself to Territorial Defense and the so-called JNA [Yugoslav People's Army]. Nevertheless, with only formal opposition 'from the top,' conditions have been created in Serbia for gathering volunteers and creating party military units: 'Dusan Silni,' the 'White Eagles,' etc. Just as everyone who has had any political ambitions at all has gathered around politics, these units have also gained members and even leaders who have been in trouble with the law on more than one occasion (some of them even knew how to profit from those conflicts by collaborating with the political police)."

The similarities among the most prominent leaders of the Serbian armed units (Captain Dragan, Arkan, Giska, and Dugi) are striking: all of them had a stormy past, and in the meantime have become successful and wealthy businessmen; all of them, feeling that it was required of them, have left their families (there is no such information regarding Captain Dragan) and gone to fight. Branslav Lainovic Dugi finds the motive for these decisions in just one word—patriotism. Dobrivoje Radovanovic accepts that assessment:

"In the prison system, the values of patriotism, the freedom of the country, and even the freedom of opinion are very highly esteemed. These values are developed as a reaction to a penal system that exerts pressure and humiliates people. Because of this, great sensitivity is shown to any attempt to limit freedom. Another possible motive is redemption. Many criminals live with an intense feeling of guilt because of the crimes they have committed. A way to 'repent their sins' may be to prove one's own quality in fighting (even with a rifle in one's hand) for the basic values of society."

Similarities and Differences

The similarities among the above-mentioned people are pronounced, and differences appear primarily in the authorities' attitude toward them, i.e., toward their units. Zeljko Raznjatovic Arkan, the commander of the Serbian Volunteer Guard, has neutralized all tones of opposition among the "heroes" (the most fervent Red Star fans). He has been so successful in this work that former Serbian minister of internal affairs, Radmilo Bogdanovic, publicly lamented Arkan's absence from Belgrade during the March demonstrations: "If Arkan had been here, everything would have been different." The embrace between Bogdanovic and Arkan at one of Red Star's celebrations was recorded by photojournalists, who thus immortalized a touching friendship. Captain Dragan, as the leader of Babic's special units, is also "morally and politically suitable." In contrast to them, the Serbian Guard, and especially its leaders Djordje Bozovic Giska, Branslav Matic Beli, and Branko Lainovic Dugi are out of favor with the regime. Since they have been denied the opportunity to fight in Slavonia for a long time, the members of the Guard, in response to a personal invitation from local defense commander Rade Cubril, have left for Gospic, where they find themselves between two fires: on one hand, the Croatian Ministry of

Internal Affairs and the National Guard Corps, and on the other, the ruling regime of the Krajina SAO [Serbian Autonomous Province], which, according to Lainovic, is "stubbornly blocking them and holding them back."

Dr. Vasilijevec also points out the authorities' dual criteria:

"The official authorities do not have the same attitude toward everyone, and that is best proven by the negative publicity that Giska and Beli received, whereas they have kept silent about Jovic's and Seselj's units. It can be said that the SPS is in a political bloc with Jovic's SNO [Serbian National Renewal] and Seselj's radicals. In those conditions, the units of Serbian National Renewal and the Serbian Radical Party represent a reliable base for the socialists in Slavonia and Krajina, whereas, because of the political strength of the Serbian Renewal Movement, any possible military success on that side interferes with and threatens their interests."

In any case, in the next few days the residents of Belgrade are burying Djordje Bozovic Giska, a man who promised that he would "strangle communism with his bare hands." When they will bury this senseless war is uncertain. An answer to that question should perhaps be sought from those who leave their residences from time to time so that, without stopping their "playing" with war, in The Hague or somewhere else, at least so far, they can play a few games of "how to deceive Lord Carrington and convince him that those others are responsible for everything."

Errors of Croatian Democratic Community Viewed

92BA0046B Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 27 Sep 91
pp 14-15

[Interview with Miko Tripalo, member of the Presidency of the Croatian People's Party, by Dusan Masic in Zagreb; date not given: "All the Mistakes of the Croatia Democratic Community"—first paragraph is NIN introduction]

[Text] "You must know that Serbs in Croatia have long been used against Croats, or at least attempts have been made to use them. Not right now, but rather throughout our entire history.... There is one source of (this) instrumentalization of Serbs, but the degree of success has always depended on the policy pursued by Croatia towards Serbia. If that policy was wrong, then the success of those who wanted to instrumentalize the Serbs was greater...."

We interviewed Miko Tripalo during the 15th air-raid alarm in his office, located in one of the most beautiful parts of Zagreb. As he told us, one slowly gets used to the alarms, and he would go to the shelter only if there was serious shelling. Since both sides interpret this war, and this type of war, as they see fit, we asked Mr. Tripalo to define this conflict.

[Tripalo] It is an attack on Croatia. The fighting is taking place on Croatian territory, and Croatian villages are being evacuated. Of course, that does not mean that Serbs are not fleeing as well, because when the shooting begins, everyone whose life is threatened must flee, but we here consider—and in this we are all united, both government and opposition—that this is an attack on Croatia. The intention, in our opinion, is to revise the internal borders of Yugoslavia and potentially to challenge the results of the referendum held by Croatia two months ago.

[Masic] Even when children are killed, it is known who fired first. In your opinion, who began this war?

[Tripalo] There are several beginnings. I think that who fired the first shot is not important; rather, of much greater importance are the basic causes of the crisis that this country is undergoing. In my opinion, they lie in the Greater Serbian policy of Slobodan Milosevic, who has attempted, in contravention of all previously applicable legal norms in this country (which, admittedly, are no longer in force today), to alter the country's constitutional order. First of all, through his attitude towards autonomy within the framework of Serbia, towards Montenegro, and later through his attitude towards Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. Naturally, it is another question whether there were certain faults in the previous constitutional system. There clearly were, because we too were dissatisfied with a number of things, but I question whether it was necessary to make changes in the system itself in the way in which they were done, asking the others to agree to only those norms and solutions that suit Milosevic and his policy.

[Masic] If the escalation of nationalist policy began upon Milosevic's assumption of power, how did this reflect on Croatia and on the development of Croatian nationalist policy?

[Tripalo] First of all, leaving aside the question of who constitutes the extreme in Serbia and who in Croatia, it is a fact that extremism on one side fuels extremism on the other side, whether it wants to or not. That is a fact, and this war, if you like, as well as a peaceful solution to all this, if some agreement on coexistence is eventually found, is made all the more difficult by the fact that this war is reinforcing extremism on both the Croatian and the Serbian side. Secondly, it is a fact that Croatia, and probably Serbia before it, felt in some sense nationally repressed by the former regime. After the demolition of that one-party system, we saw an explosion of various ideas together with an explosion of nationalism. You have seen how the results of elections in all the republics have been such that this national momentum clearly played a decisive role. That is a fact, and we can be happy about that or not, but one had to expect that sort of development of events, given the pressure with which the national existence of every nation in Yugoslavia was suppressed prior to that.

[Masic] In what way did the national plan in the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] program differ from that of the coalition?

[Tripalo] The elections were more a vote "against" than "for." Second, it is obvious that the people responded better to higher-decibel shouting about what is happening, and everything that was in some sense more extreme was expressed more forcefully. The basic difference, in my opinion, was that the HDZ promised to put its program into effect immediately, tomorrow, which today has proven to be completely unrealistic, although we cannot deny that they have a consistent Croatian national plan. In contrast, we supported radical changes in the political and economic system, but in as peaceful and democratic a way as possible, without any sort of discrimination towards citizens, and without any sort of revanchism with respect to either national, religious, or party affiliation. Today, we are seeing how right these ideas of ours were.

[Masic] What then are the mistakes that the government of the Croatian Democratic Community has made?

[Tripalo] In my opinion, the main mistake that has been made in Croatia was to attempt to achieve overnight something that can be effected only through patient political work with a long-term program. The HDZ thought that it could enact anything it wanted through its voting machine in the Croatian Assembly and in the opstina assemblies, and that it would implement whatever it enacted, but they did not take into account the fact that with such enormous social and political questions, one should achieve as broad a social consensus as possible in order to be able to implement anything like that. Thus, they found themselves beating their heads against a wall. At the same time, they devoted too much attention to formal and, I would say, insignificant questions during their triumphal celebrations instead of concerning themselves with important questions. However, they had neither the strength, nor the knowledge, nor the abilities necessary for this. As far as political mistakes are concerned, I think that they made a mistake in relation to the Serbs in Croatia, or better: in relation to the non-Croat population. Specifically, during the election campaign, the HDZ talked only about Croats, and then after the electoral victory they still talked exclusively about Croats. The existence of Serbs and other national minorities was ignored. And there was no political comprehension of the fact that the problems of all minorities can be solved only through political agreement. Still, I do not think that this is the basic reason for what is happening to us today. You must know that Serbs in Croatia have long been used against Croats, or at least attempts have been made to use them. Not right now, but rather throughout our entire history. If you look at the struggle for the national interests of Croats in Dalmatia, against Italian autonomists, you will see that they wanted to use as many Serbs as possible, giving them certain special positions and privileges. The same

was true in Austria-Hungary, to say nothing of the old Yugoslavia. Unfortunately, it was also the case in the new one.

There is one source of the instrumentalization of Serbs to use them against Croats, but the dimensions and degree of success have always depended on the policy pursued by Croatia towards Serbia. If that policy was wrong, then the success of those who wanted to instrumentalize the Serbs was greater. Accordingly, the basic cause of the current situation is that Belgrade is in fact unreconciled with the transformation of Yugoslavia, and I would say that the armed rebellion by the Serbs is simply the way in which Slobodan Milosevic is discussing the transformation of Yugoslavia. It is the Damocles' sword that he is holding over our heads. That is the basic cause, and stupid statements, extremist statements and certain actions have simply reinforced the certain amount of uncertainty and fear that had developed among Serbs when this new Croatian government appeared on the scene. In all of this, you must keep in mind that the regions that are caught up in this rebellion in Croatia do not represent the majority of Serbs in Croatia. For that reason, it is not possible to say that the majority of that nation is currently seized by rebellion, although we can say that that percentage is much greater than we thought it would be.

Paramilitary Units of Croatian Rights Party

92BA0024A Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 20 Sep 91
pp 14-15

[Article by Srdjan Radulovic: "Arrival of Paraga's Legions"—first paragraph is NIN introduction]

[Text] Can Dobroslov Paraga, who is allegedly "providing 10,000 superbly equipped and trained warriors for the Croatian defense," strengthen the weakest point in Croatia's defense, "Tudjman's capitulatory policy"?

The Croatian Rights Party [HSP] has committed to Croatia's defense 10,000 of its own members, "superbly equipped and trained warriors, who have thus far proven themselves on the fronts of eastern Slavonia to be Croatia's best defenders." They are in the ranks or the reserves of the National Guard Corps [ZNG], and do not constitute a party army, as stated by HSP leader Dobroslov Paraga, but they differ in the insignia on their uniforms, since in addition to the ZNG insignia, they also have on their left shoulders the abbreviation HOS (Croatian Defensive Alliance) and the message "Ready for the home."

This news has not caused any significant commentary. For the Belgrade media, this is understandable, since they have been calling the Croatian armed forces Ustasha units for a long time anyway. On the other hand, it is unrealistic to expect the Croatian media to abandon the role of "agitprop" defense of the regime, even though the inclusion of Paraga's neo-Ustashi among the troops

defending that regime, who persistently declare themselves to be democratic and antifascist, constitutes a glaring contradiction.

The involvement of the soldiers "ready for the home" merits attention, however, even though the internal affairs forces and the National Guard Corps have already displayed the "symptoms" of neo-Ustashism by killing helpless old people, hanging dogs, and writing the letter "U" or "Black Legion" in Serbian villages. In fact, Paraga does not conceal the fact that he is conducting an anti-Serbian genocidal policy, nor that Ante Pavelic, the head of the NDH [Independent State of Croatia] has a significant place among its "ideologues." Since the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] leadership decided on a more subtle policy after their victory in the elections, Paraga's extremism did not suit them. For a time his party could not even be registered, and we also recall the disassociation from the HSP's policy in Croatian television's news broadcasts, which were certainly not authored by the editors of those broadcasts. Nevertheless, tacit tolerance of Paraga's political actions soon occurred, and he more and more often attended the "sessions" of the leaders of the Croatian opposition parties, up until the recent formation of a new Croatian government. Finally, at a time when comments or statements that "Tudjman's capitulatory policy" was the weakest point in the Croatian defense were appearing more and more often in the Croatian press, Paraga publicly stated not only that his neo-Ustashi were already fighting, but also that the HSP "was providing 10,000 superbly equipped and trained warriors for Croatia's defense."

It is quite clear what the "Croatian defense" will be like if one knows that the HSP's members swear an "oath" under a picture of Ante Pavelic. Another, no less significant factor in the inclusion of Paraga's neo-Ustashi in the ranks of the ZNG is the real possibility of achieving dominance in the ZNG, taking over command positions, and putting pressure on the "weakest point in the Croatian defense." Paraga's goal is not to become a "copy" of Tito, like Tudjman, but rather to succeed the leader Pavelic, with equally totalitarian syndromes of political activity. Paraga has an advantage because he gained political legitimacy immediately, whereas Tudjman is still struggling between his real inclinations and those that he represents politically.

In the long run, Paraga also has the advantage in what one might call the military area. He chose western Hercegovina for his recruitment base, and he has already engaged a large number of internal affairs and ZNG troops from that area, as demonstrated by documents that officers in the JNA's [Yugoslav People's Army] Knin corps have captured or found. According to those sources, there are five brigades stationed in the area of northern Dalmatia alone (the 112th, 113th, 114th, and the 4th, and one joint brigade). This last one is composed of people from western Hercegovina, while the 4th Brigade, located in the area of Krusevo near Obrovac, includes a company "enlisted" in Tomislavgrad.

A message was left in several houses in the Serbian village of Otisic after the ZNG's withdrawal: "The Black Legion for Ljubuska." While Paraga has been freely agitating throughout western Hercegovina, selecting Pavelic's birthplace, Listica, for his party meetings—not by coincidence at all—Tudjman has been suffering defeats on the battlefield, and, unable to change anything and blunt the criticisms, has been changing ministers of defense and internal affairs as if they were the heads of municipal enterprises.

Dobroslov Paraga, the head of the HSP, has gone on the offensive, and on the same day that he announced that the Ustashi were leaving "to fight for their people," Milan Djukic, the head of the Serbian Popular Party [SNS], also spoke out. "We call upon the Serbian people in Croatia to oppose and refuse to obey the self-appointed leaders who have imposed themselves upon them through terror and dirty propaganda, and to join the Croatian people in defending their homeland from the war of the Bolshevik and Greater-Serbian clique. Only a joint struggle can secure our life together in the Republic of Croatia," Djukic announced, forgetting that he himself is a self-appointed leader, and probably the only leader of a national party that is summoning its members to a war against their compatriots. In view of the number of SNS members, there is nothing else left for Djukic to do but respond to his own appeal. Perhaps he will meet Paraga somewhere.

Bosnian Crisis Command Coordinator Interviewed

92BA0060A Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 1 Oct 91 pp 30-31

[Interview with Dr. Ejup Ganic, member of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Crisis Command coordinator, by Fahrudin Radoncic; place and date not given: "We Know How To Defend Ourselves"]

[Text] The subject of this DANAS interview, Dr. Ejup Ganic, member of the B-H [Bosnia-Herzegovina] Presidency and coordinator of the newly formed Crisis Command, is an atypical figure in Yugoslav politics. First of all, he is a professor in the School of Mechanical Engineering at Sarajevo University who built his career as a scientist in the United States, and then he rushed into the waters of Balkan politics as an independent candidate. Better known in Bosnia and Herzegovina than elsewhere, this calm politician, who is nevertheless precise in what he says, violated yet another unwritten rule of politics: that is, he has been appearing frequently in the pages of the press here with his own articles and personal opinions on current events. We talked with him on the topic that is most urgent at the moment—Bosnia-Herzegovina being drawn into the war as a military participant.

[Radoncic] The situation in B-H has suddenly become more tense since the arrival of the Serbian and Montenegrin reservists. One of the republic's first measures was

to form the Crisis Command. What was the main reason behind that decision, and what are the command's principal tasks?

[Ganic] The Crisis Command was formed in order to strengthen coordination among government institutions and identify the problems more easily. It is our task to pass on a warning in a particular way to the B-H Presidency and the government; this does not mean that we are taking over their powers. Of course, the Crisis Command does have the obligation in an emergency to suggest certain lines of activity in the sense of rapid protection of refugees of all three nationalities, which was a result of the arrival of the Serbian and Montenegrin reservists. We are trying to remedy the situation by providing basic foodstuffs, medical supplies, and similar needs, envisaging that the crisis could in fact last quite a long time.

In that context, we are mindful of protecting the republic's credit and monetary system. And then there are several other tasks such as protecting vital fuel and energy facilities, the infrastructure, the information system, and so on. The Crisis Command has in a way established a linkage between the Presidency, which protects and symbolizes statehood, and the government, the body which has the executive function.

Which means that we are a kind of catalyst between the political and administrative authorities, if I might so put it.

[Radoncic] It is a fact that the Crisis Command was formed immediately after the arrival of the Serbian-Montenegrin reservists.

[Ganic] Yes, because the virus of civil war was thrust into the republic. The behavior of the reservists was such that they resembled anything but a regular army or any army with any decency. The behavior of those people—breaking in shops, looting, harassing citizens, carousing, and uncontrolled shooting—clearly belied the utter baseness and worthlessness of the mutual settling of accounts. It is that simple. Before they came we had peace, and now we have all of a sudden lost it. That is why we immediately formed the Crisis Command.

[Radoncic] The Montenegrin president, Momir Bulatovic, does not share that opinion, and he referred to the criticism of the reservists in political terms as an anti-Army and anti-Montenegrin campaign.

[Ganic] He is far away from these problems. I know that no one went to him either asking if they could send reservists into Bosnia-Herzegovina. But we did expect that he possibly could have the goodwill to intervene politically and help in calming down the situation and exerting pressure toward more proper behavior on the part of the reservists. The Montenegrins are a people with a long tradition of statehood, and as a people they understand what statehood means and that they should not threaten the statehood of others. The reservists have obviously not been behaving in that way. These are

extremists who discredit the glorious traditions, because who else today voluntarily consents to go to war and to make troubles in another republic for a people that is entirely innocent. Only ethnically infected extremists. The other day I was in Belgrade and I saw people seeing off a young man going into the reserves. They were celebrating, crying, and shouting: "We are going to teach them a lesson." Now, just imagine that riffraff and those bullies when they get in the regular army among the young soldiers, our children, who have been brought up quite differently. This is a devastation of the Army, and those destructive individuals and groups, to make matters worse, have entirely taken over the initiative.

[Radoncic] You have sent a letter to General Kadijevic concerning this. If it is not a secret, what did you write to him, and do you harbor any optimism that it will have any effect?

[Ganic] One day, when things are put in order, I think that that letter will nevertheless have some small historic weight. I wrote to him about how the reservists were behaving, I told him how the citizens of B-H perceive these roaming reservists (bashi bozhuk) who are bringing the fuse of civil war into this republic, and in a way I warned him that as a responsible man he must face this responsibility. At the same time, I wrote that I hope he would read that letter, expressing a certain suspicion that perhaps there is some blockade that will be an invincible obstacle so that that fact will never reach Kadijevic at all. In this entire situation, I think that the top military leadership has shown professional immaturity in assessment of the situation, political dilettantism, and, of course, ambitions which are such as not to be compatible with a democratic system.

[Radoncic] Do you believe that it is just a question of mere dilettantism and immaturity, or is it rather a national and ideological orientation of the Army that is not at all naive and certainly does not make the Army a truly Yugoslav force?

[Ganic] When I speak about the bad assessment of the generals and their lack of professionalism, I am thinking in a total way about the decisions which the Army has been making recently. From the instant when Mr. Kadijevic publicly announced that the top federal leadership had fallen apart, according to his assessment—the Assembly, the Presidency, the government—I said that even if he were right in what he said about Mesic and Markovic, Kadijevic is the last person in this country called upon to comment on that. Accordingly, after that everything became clearer. Including the fact that the Army is now testing Bosnia to see how firm it is in its commitment not to remain in some truncated Yugoslavia. Precisely the fact of that population which offered passive resistance, which fled, this was actually to say that it is an illusion that B-H can remain in some truncated Yugoslavia. This continues to be a mistake of the top Army leadership, whose departure and replacement would solve many things in this country.

[Radoncic] Of what are you specifically thinking?

[Ganic] I am thinking of replacement of the General Staff and formation of some command group to rescue and revitalize the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] on parity principles. In that way, the narrow Serbian leadership would lose its influence. The law of connected vessels would "determine" that this occur to the other side as well, so that the situation in the country would calm down and improve. So, if I were able to choose which is the most painless and most effective way of resolving the Yugoslav crisis, then I would opt for resignation of the top military leadership. In that case, the Serbian leaders would be left without their strongest tool for achieving the goals set forth in the Memorandum.

[Radoncic] One can conclude from what you have said that the B-H leadership has not the least confidence in the general. At the same time, you have been placed in a situation of negotiating with the Federal Secretariat for National Defense. One Bosnian delegation has already been to Belgrade, and this was followed by optimistic statements that "there will be no war in B-H." Do you really believe in the sincerity of the military negotiators?

[Ganic] There is a misunderstanding in all of this. First, it is true that we do not have confidence in the generals at the top, because their alignment and their actions have essentially contributed to breaking up Yugoslavia. Even earlier, we realized the incompetence of certain generals. These are people who were given the most responsible posts out of party inertia and logic, not professional competence. Then there are also officers whose education has been one-sided, and it is no surprise that in a confusing situation this kind of leadership goes rigidly to one side or the other. As for negotiations and the declaration "there will be no war in B-H," that is black humor. The implication is that we will not fight and shoot to kill against our own Army, but actually it is a question of our own MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs] assuming its powers and, together with the JNA, preventing the incidents which some people would like to see because it would justify their military intervention. Looked at in political terms, we will never give in to that kind of excuse and that method of drawing B-H into some truncated community which does not suit it and its peoples.

[Radoncic] Nevertheless, it is well known that the reservists were waiting for the high-level government delegation with pointed rifles and curses.

[Ganic] The attitude toward the deputy prime minister of B-H and the delegation was a vivid reminder of the rights B-H would have in a truncated federation and the value that would be put on its opinion. If it can be put this way, everything that has been happening and is happening since the incursion of the Serbian and Montenegrin reservists is making Bosnia-Herzegovina more self-confident and resolved. Even that tiny fraction of

the population, a few percent, who were ready to accept the idea of a truncated federation have now realized that they should not do that.

[Radoncic] That may be so, but with what forces, means, and methods can this republic resist and defend itself against the forcible military embrace and being swallowed up into the state and the territory of an expanded Serbia?

[Ganic] We have been and are doing everything, first of all, to prevent bloodshed. These past days we have avoided our own "Prague Spring" and "fraternal aid." We have instructed people to take shelter and not to be taken in by provocations. We do not believe that anything new will be revealed if, say, five or six people throw themselves under the tanks. The idea of a segment of the top military leadership is well known anyway and already exposed. But we must do everything so that our children, our soldiers from B-H, are not made to serve that idea. As far as I know, there are 50,000 or 60,000 active officers in the Army, so let them go wage the war themselves. I am certain that we will not accept a military occupation if it occurs. We have already taken all steps for foreign observers to come here, and it will be very difficult for us, the leadership, to guarantee the security of the Army in moments of civil disobedience toward it. It would be awkward for me to run down the catalogue of actions in this case, but we would certainly call upon our own members of the armed forces, regardless of their nationality, to desert, and we would appeal to the population to offer other forms of resistance.

[Radoncic] Up to now, the generals have been unreceptive to that kind of warning. What if the Army nevertheless decides that Bosnia-Herzegovina is to remain in some kind of three-member federation?

[Ganic] As a practical matter, that is not possible. How could the Army bring that about anyway? To kill us all? We simply are going to fight and we do not want any community except a six-member community of sovereign republic-states. Any imposition of a truncated Yugoslavia would in practical terms signify war in these parts, and it would last for the next 20 years.

[Radoncic] Are you an optimist on the question of resolving the dispute between the Army and B-H?

[Ganic] The way all of us assess it in these large transformations, the same fate awaits the Army as well. What does it mean when it comes into conflict with one or several of its nationalities on its own territory?

The political commitment of the Army, military pressure, and many such things indicate that its rapid transformation is a vital necessity. I have already been critical about it, so I would not elaborate once again on things which are known.

If for no other reason than because in the light of my official contacts with the generals, I think that it would not be politically and diplomatically wise to close the

door to that channel of communication. But we should remember the folksaying that the most dangerous bear is a wounded bear. That is why it needs help to get back into the cage of democratic civil authority as quickly and easily as possible.

Maribor Corps Difficulties With JNA Withdrawal *92BA0060B Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian* 4 Oct 91 p 8

[Article by Stevan Petrovic: "Only 20 Percent of Its Equipment Has Been Returned to the Maribor Corps"]

[Text] Maribor, 3 Oct—The Maribor daily newspaper VECER has a front-page article today under the headline "The City Is Sitting on a Powder Keg!" The reference is to four freight trains loaded with military equipment and explosives at the suburban railroad station Studenca, which the Yugoslav People's Army [JNA], under the agreement on withdrawal from Slovenia, is preparing for transport to southern parts of the country.

However, because it has been impossible to dispatch these trains because railroad lines are blocked in Croatia, they have been standing for more than a month now at the station in suburban Maribor, vigilantly guarded by members of the JNA military police. During that time, the Maribor police and local territorial defense have been trying in a panic to find a solution so that this city of 200,000 inhabitants does not by some chance suffer an unforeseen disaster "because of some, God save us, sabotage."

The Slovene government, however, has decided not to extend by a single day the length of the moratorium on the country's independence, and it expires on 7 October, and it is categorically demanding that all military transports of this kind, as well as the last soldier of the JNA, be withdrawn from Slovene territory no later than 18 October. After that, the Yugoslav People's Army will be treated in this republic as a foreign occupying force toward which all the steps of war will be taken.

Aside from the factor of the Croatian railroads, there is also the so-called Slovene "factor" here, and that is creating still more complications. What does this actually amount to?

Lieutenant Colonel Komnen Zarkovic, who is responsible for what is called disassociation of the Army with Slovenia in this region, explains:

"Although an intensive effort has been made on this job for more than two months, the Slovene side has returned to the Army barely 20 percent of the equipment and combat gear captured during the brief conflict in late June and early July of this year. And what has been returned has been damaged or cannibalized. The only things that have been returned in good order are artillery shells and explosives. All the rest—tanks, self-propelled and other artillery guns, cannons, howitzers, and also artillery armament, have been disabled...."

The commission headed by Lt. Col. Zarkovic has no power at all to solve this problem on its own. It has received no help whatsoever from superior commands in Zagreb and Belgrade, and October, bringing the day when the moratorium expires, is just around the corner. After that, the Slovenes have the right to capture all the combat equipment as the property of a foreign occupying army! According to the subject of the interview, even the commission of the other side, that is, of the Slovene Territorial Defense, with which cooperation has been rather good and correct, is powerless in many respects, so that it must request interpretations from the republic Defense Ministry even for the most harmless problems.

Another trouble of the Maribor Corps is that some time ago it sent a sizable portion of its expensive military equipment and supplies to the neighboring Varazdin Corps, so that because of the surrender of that corps by General Vladimir Trifunovic, this combat equipment has fallen into the hands of Tudjman's armed formations.

Nevertheless, most of the combat equipment and armament was evacuated from the Maribor Corps in good time to new locations in Serbia.

However, that is not the case with certain important units of the 14th Ljubljana Corps. There, the greatest threat has come to about 70 tanks and armored vehicles

belonging to the armored brigade in Vrhnica. This is also equipment which it has been impossible to dispatch by railroad through Croatia, and the Slovenes warn that those vehicles may not travel their highways in order of battle. Once the moratorium on independence expires, that is, in just four days, the Slovene Army could treat this combat equipment of the JNA as occupier's machines, i.e., it could destroy them on its territory, which undoubtedly would evoke a reaction in kind from the Yugoslav People's Army. That is why the fear of the people here is not altogether without basis.

When it comes to disassociation, there is another extremely large problem in the area of the Maribor Corps. The JNA has a housing stock of about 600 units here. What is happening in Maribor now is that unknown persons are entering apartments left vacant and taking them over under cover of night. The Army has complained to the police here and asked for help, but so far there have been no results in combating cases of this kind.

"We have also been plundered in Croatia," says Lt. Col. Komnen Zarkovic. "Tudjman's forces have stopped several freight trains carrying our combat equipment being shipped to Serbia and other locations. Much of those weapons have disappeared without a trace and with no way of getting them back again."

NTIS
ATTN: PROCESS 103
5285 PORT ROYAL RD
SPRINGFIELD, VA

2

22161

This is a U.S. Government publication. Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government. Users of this publication may cite FBIS or JPRS provided they do so in a manner clearly identifying them as the secondary source.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) publications contain political, military, economic, environmental, and sociological news, commentary, and other information, as well as scientific and technical data and reports. All information has been obtained from foreign radio and television broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers, books, and periodicals. Items generally are processed from the first or best available sources. It should not be inferred that they have been disseminated only in the medium, in the language, or to the area indicated. Items from foreign language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed. Except for excluding certain diacritics, FBIS renders personal and place-names in accordance with the romanization systems approved for U.S. Government publications by the U.S. Board of Geographic Names.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by FBIS/JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpts] in the first line of each item indicate how the information was processed from the original. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear from the original source but have been supplied as appropriate to the context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by the source. Passages in boldface or italics are as published.

SUBSCRIPTION/PROCUREMENT INFORMATION

The FBIS DAILY REPORT contains current news and information and is published Monday through Friday in eight volumes: China, East Europe, Soviet Union, East Asia, Near East & South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and West Europe. Supplements to the DAILY REPORTs may also be available periodically and will be distributed to regular DAILY REPORT subscribers. JPRS publications, which include approximately 50 regional, worldwide, and topical reports, generally contain less time-sensitive information and are published periodically.

Current DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are listed in *Government Reports Announcements* issued semimonthly by the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161 and the *Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications* issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

The public may subscribe to either hardcover or microfiche versions of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications through NTIS at the above address or by calling (703) 487-4630. Subscription rates will be

provided by NTIS upon request. Subscriptions are available outside the United States from NTIS or appointed foreign dealers. New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.

U.S. Government offices may obtain subscriptions to the DAILY REPORTs or JPRS publications (hardcover or microfiche) at no charge through their sponsoring organizations. For additional information or assistance, call FBIS, (202) 338-6735, or write to P.O. Box 2604, Washington, D.C. 20013. Department of Defense consumers are required to submit requests through appropriate command validation channels to DIA, RTS-2C, Washington, D.C. 20301. (Telephone: (202) 373-3771, Autovon: 243-3771.)

Back issues or single copies of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are not available. Both the DAILY REPORTs and the JPRS publications are on file for public reference at the Library of Congress and at many Federal Depository Libraries. Reference copies may also be seen at many public and university libraries throughout the United States.